

OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731


July 6, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-23/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report
to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-23/3L in compliance with
paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.



Very truly yours,

J. P. Pulling Jr.
Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President - JCP&L
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

IE 22
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-23/3L

Report Date

July 6, 1981

Occurrence Date

June 3, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

A limiting condition for operation was exceeded when the differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber was not maintained within the acceptable operating range given in Figure 3.5-1 of the Technical Specifications. This is a violation of Technical Specification paragraph 3.5.A.9a.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

| | | |
|--------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Power: | Reactor | 1563 MWt |
| | Generator | 470 MWe |
| Flow: | Recirculation | 13.0×10^4 gpm |
| | Feedwater | 5.13×10^6 lb/hr |

Description of Occurrence

On Wednesday, June 3, 1981, at approximately 2230, drywell to torus differential pressure was below the acceptable value as defined by figure 3.5-1 in the Technical Specifications. The incident occurred when the drywell was vented to zero PSIG in order to initiate a nitrogen high flow purge to reduce oxygen concentration. Previously the oxygen content in the drywell was increasing towards the 5 percent limit. The Nitrogen Makeup System was utilized in an effort to reduce the amount of oxygen, however, the oxygen percentage continued to rise from 4.0% to 4.75% in approximately fourteen hours. The instrumentation to measure drywell O_2 was checked by the Instrument Department and determined to be accurate. After consultation with the Group Shift Supervisor, based on the discussion in the Analysis of Occurrence Section of this report, a management decision was made to vent the drywell below the specified operating range. At the time of the incident, the torus level was indicated at 4.5 inches which corresponds to 3.5 feet downcomer submergence. The minimum acceptable drywell to torus differential pressure for this submergence is 1.0 PSID.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the incident was the increasing oxygen concentration in the drywell. Subsequent to the inerting of the drywell, a considerable amount of moisture was found in the instrument lines of the oxygen analyzer. It is suspected that a moisture buildup caused an erroneous operation of the analyzer, indicating high oxygen concentrations. This was substantiated by no further increase in oxygen concentration once the moisture was removed.

The maximum drywell oxygen content is 5 percent according to Technical Specification 3.5.A.6. After unsuccessful attempts at nitrogen makeup and discovering the source of the leak, the drywell was vented and differential pressure re-established.

Analysis of Occurrence

Maintaining drywell to torus differential pressure within the range specified on figure 3.5-1 of the Technical Specifications assures the integrity of the torus when subjected to post LOCA torus hydrodynamic forces. The Technical Specifications state in section 3.5.A.9, however, that the differential pressure may be reduced to less than the range specified on figure 3.5-1 for a maximum of four hours during required operability testing of the drywell torus vacuum breakers. In addition, specification 3.5.A.9.b states that "if the differential pressure of specification 3.5.A.9.a cannot be maintained, and the differential pressure cannot be restored within the subsequent 6 hour period, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated". Since the differential pressure was reestablished within two hours, a plant shutdown was not initiated. Based on the above, the safety significance is considered to be minimal.

Corrective Action

The drywell was reinerted and differential pressure was increased to the normal operating range. Procedures will be reviewed to assure that operators and instrument technicians will be guided to specifically address the moisture problem. Additionally, an Engineering Request has been submitted to evaluate or upgrade the oxygen analyzer instrumentation as a result of past experiences of false oxygen concentration indications.

Failure Data

Not applicable.