


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L / GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

July 1, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406



Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-21/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-21/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

I. R. Finrock, Jr.
Ivan R. Finrock, Jr.
Vice President - JCP&L
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

*IRF22
5/1*

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-21/3L

Report Date

July 1, 1981

Occurrence Date

June 3, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

Reactor High Pressure Sensors RE03B, C and D trip settings were discovered to be greater than 1060 PSI.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at Steady State Conditions.

Power:	Reactor	1518 MWt
	Generator	488 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	14.1×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	5.55×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On June 3, 1981 at approximately 1330 hours while performing surveillance testing, Reactor High Pressure Sensors RE03B, C and D were found to be less conservative than that specified in Technical Specifications. Tests on all reactor high pressure switches revealed the following data:

	<u>Press. Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>	<u>As Left</u>
System 1	RE03A	1068	1068	1068
	RE03C	1066	1070	1065
System 2	RE03B	1068	1074	1068
	RE03D	1066	1074	1064

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of switches RE03B, C and D tripping within 8 PSI of setpoint is attributed to sensor repeatability.

Analysis of Occurrence

The setting on the reactor high pressure scram, anticipating scram, reactor coolant system relief valves and isolation condenser have been established to assure never reaching the reactor coolant system pressure safety limit as well as assuring the system pressure does not exceed the range of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. In addition, the APRM neutron flux scram and the turbine bypass system also provide protection for these safety limits e.g. turbine trip and loss of electrical load transients. In addition to preventing power operation above 1060 PSIG, the pressure scram backs up the other scrams for these transients and other steam line isolation type transients. Analysis of worst case turbine trip, without bypass transient indicates that the relief valves limit the peak pressure to 1188 PSIG well below the 1250 PSIG range of applicability of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit and the 1375 PSIG reactor coolant system pressure safety limit. The reactor coolant system safety valves offer yet another protective feature for the reactor coolant system pressure safety limit since these valves are sized assuming no credit for other pressure relief devices.

The safety valves are sized according to the code for a condition of turbine stop valve closure, without bypass, while operating at 1930 MWt followed by (1) a delay of all scrams (2) failure of the turbine bypass valves to open and (3) failure of the isolation condensers and relief valves to operate. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal because each switch would have operated within 8 psig above setpoint limit.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action consisted of resetting Reactor High Pressure Sensors RE03B, C and D to trip within the prescribed safety limit. An engineering study concerning related problems with ITT Barton Switches indicated some contribution of calibration techniques with instrument repeatability. Certain recommendations of the study, including independent verification of as-found values, if out of tolerance adjusting the test variable slowly to avoid misreading, and verification of switch actuation value after the switch lock is tightened will be incorporated into our calibration procedures for these switches. The long term solution will be the replacement of the RE03 pressure switches with an analog trip system during our upcoming refueling outage.

Failure Data

Barksdale Pressure Actuated Switch (3)
Switch B2T-A12SS
Proof 1800 PSI
Adjustable Range 50-1200 PSIG