

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5		
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER						25	26	LICENSE TYPE						57	CAT 58				

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	6	6	7	0	4	1	3	8	1	8	0	5	0	5	8	1	9
7	8	REPORT SOURCE		60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE				74	75	REPORT DATE				80		

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0	2	While the plant was in steady state operation at 2282 Mwt, Reactor Building																																																																															
0	3	to Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2T48-F310, failed open. Tech																																																																															
0	4	Specs 3.6.3 requires that primary containment isolation valves be operable.																																																																															
0	5	Redundant Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2T48-																																																																															
0	6	F311, was operable. Plant operation was not affected as a result of this																																																																															
0	7	event. The health and safety of the public was not affected. This is a																																																																															
0	8	repetitive event as reported on Reportable Occurrence Report 50-366/1980-96.																																																																															

0	9	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE										COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		
7	8	S	D	11	E	12	E	13	I	N	S	T	R	U	14	S	15	Z	16			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.												
17		8	1	0	3	5	0	3	L	0												
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER						
E	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	A	25	S	3	8	2	26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1	0	The cause of the event has been attributed to Reactor Building to Torus																																																																															
1	1	Differential Pressure Switch, 2T48-N210. The failure was due to too great																																																																															
1	2	of a reset span possibly caused by a sticking switch mechanism. The mech-																																																																															
1	3	anism was cleaned with a cleaner lubricant and the switch exercised several																																																																															
1	4	times and returned to service. A new switch has been ordered.																																																																															

1	5	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
7	8	E	28	0	9	4	29	NA	A	31	Operator observation
ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE					
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	NA				
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION							
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA			
PERSONNEL INJURIES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION							
1	8	0	0	0	40			NA			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION							
1	9	Z	42					NA			
PUBLICITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION							
2	0	N	44					NA			

8105120383

NAME OF PREPARER R. T. Nix, Supt. of Maint.

PHONE: 912-367-7781

NRC USE ONLY

68 69 80 81

LER No.: 50-366/1981-035
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket No.: 50-366

Narrative Report
for LER No. 50-366/1981-035

On April 1, 1981, while the plant was in steady state operation at 2282 MWt, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2T48-F310, failed open. Tech Specs Section 3.6.3. requires that primary containment isolation valves be operable. Redundant Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2T48-311, was operable. Plant operation was not affected as a result of this event. The health and safety of the public was not affected. This event is repetitive as last reported on Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-366/1980-96.

The cause of the event has been attributed to Reactor Building to Torus Differential Pressure Switch, 2T48-N210. The failure was due to too great of a reset span possibly caused by a sticking switch mechanism. The mechanism was cleaned with electrical contact lubricant cleaner, then exercised several times and checked for correct operation. The switch was then recalibrated per HNP-2-5240, Static-o-ring Pressure Switch Calibration, and returned to service. A new switch has been ordered to replace the existing switch.

A generic review revealed no inherent problems with this switch for this particular application. Unit I does not use this type switch for this application.