

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
P.O. Box 2000  
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

January 29, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-328

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R

This facsimile transmission confirms information concerning noncompliance with requirements of License Condition Section 2.C.13.c of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License initially reported by telephone notifications at 1401 eastern standard time (EST) on January 26, 1990, and at 1456 EST on January 29, 1990. The conditions are applicable to both Units 1 and 2. This report is being made in accordance with License Condition 2.H.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



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Interim Site Director

Enclosure  
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## Enclosure

A noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requirements was documented on Condition Adverse to Quality Report SQP900040 on January 26, 1990.

Section III.G.2 requires redundant safe shutdown components to be separated from each other by one of the following methods:

1. Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a three-hour rating.
2. Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
3. Enclosure of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

Contrary to Section III.G.2., electrical cables required to ensure a reactor coolant system (RCS) letdown path exists do not meet the separation requirements. These interactions are located in the auxiliary building Units 1 and 2 Mechanical Equipment Rooms A8 and A9, respectively, at Elevation 749. As a result of further review of this condition, an additional interaction on Unit 2 was identified on January 28, 1990. This interaction involves the electrical cables for the 125-volt, direct current power supply to Valve 2-PCV-68-334 (RCS pressurizer power operated relief valve [PORV]) and its associated block valve (2-FCV-68-333). Fire induced damage to these cables could result in the spurious opening of the PORV and the inability to close the associated block valve.

These areas are provided with fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system. Additionally, these areas are included in the existing hourly roving fire watches. This condition was identified during a review of the Appendix R drawings.