

PROPOSED NEW SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.10

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## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.10 NONINTERRUPTIBLE CONTROL AIR SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.7.10 Two independent Noninterruptible Control Air (NIAS) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem :
- a. Consisting of one OPERABLE Control Air Compressor, Aftercooler, associated Dehydration and Filter Units, Air Receiver Tank, and associated control instrumentation.
  - b. Capable of automatic isolation from nonsafety grade air systems.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and \*

#### ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3:
  1. With one NIAS system subsystem inoperable due to an inoperable Control Air Compressor, Aftercooler, associated Dehydration or Filter Unit, or associated control instrumentation, cross-tie the NIAS system subsystem to the OPERABLE NIAS system subsystem within one hour. Restore the inoperable NIAS system subsystem to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. If the two NIAS subsystems are cross-tied under the above provisions, then components and systems which are supplied air by the NIAS system do not become inoperable due to the inoperability of the NIAS system subsystem.
  2. With one NIAS system subsystem otherwise inoperable or unable to be cross-tied under the provisions of 1) above:
    - a) Verify that the NIAS system subsystems are not cross-tied within one hour.

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\*When irradiated fuel is being handled in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

- b. Declare the affected Remote Shutdown Panel SRV controls (Division I only), Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (Drywell Hydrogen and Oxygen concentration, Drywell pressure, and Suppression Chamber pressure and water level), Primary Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity monitor (Division I only), MSIV Leakage Control System subsystem, Reactor Building - Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker isolation valve, Secondary Containment Railroad Bay Access Door, Standby Gas Treatment System subsystem, and Control Room Emergency Filtration System components inoperable and take the ACTIONS required by Specifications 3.3.7.4, 3.3.7.5, 3.6.2.1, 3.4.3.1, 3.6.1.4, 3.6.3, 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.3, and 3.7.2.
- 3. With both NIAS system subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
  - b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5, or \*:
    - 1. With one NIAS system subsystem inoperable due to an inoperable Control Air Compressor, Aftercooler, associated Dehydration or Filter Unit, or associated control instrumentation, cross-tie the NIAS system subsystem to the OPERABLE NIAS system subsystem within one hour. If the two NIAS subsystems are cross-tied under the above provisions, then components and systems which are supplied air by the NIAS system do not become inoperable due to the inoperability of the NIAS system subsystem.
    - 2. With NIAS otherwise inoperable or with the subsystems unable to be cross-tied under the provisions of 1) above, declare the Standby Gas Treatment subsystem(s), Control Room Emergency Filtration System component(s) and Secondary Containment Railroad Bay Access Door(s) inoperable and take the ACTIONS required by Specifications 3.6.5.3, 3.7.2, and 3.6.5.1.

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\*When irradiated fuel is being handled in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel.



#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.1 The Noninterruptible Control Air System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that the cross-tie valves and each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) required for proper operation of the Control Air Compressors, Aftercoolers, Filter and Dehydration Units, and associated control instrumentation that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each automatic valve which isolates the NIAS system subsystem from nonsafety grade air systems actuates to its isolation position on each of the following automatic actuation test signals:
  1. Station Air Supply low pressure
  2. NIAS Control Air header low pressure
  3. Loss of offsite power
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each Control Air Compressor capacity is greater than or equal to 100 scfm.
- d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each Control Air Compressor automatically starts on each of the following automatic actuation test signals:
  1. NIAS Control Air Header low pressure.
  2. Loss of Coolant Accident (Drywell Pressure-High and/or Reactor Vessel Level-Low Level 2).
  3. Loss of offsite power

PROPOSED BASES

### 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.10 NONINTERRUPTIBLE CONTROL AIR SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the noninterruptible control air system, which provides a safety grade back up control air source, is required to support the operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. If a Control Air Compressor, Aftercooler, Dehydration/Filter Unit or associated control instrumentation becomes inoperable, the two subsystems can be cross-tied and the control air requirements satisfied by a single compressor. Since a safety grade back up control air supply is available, components utilizing the NIAS are not made inoperable from the ACTION of cross-tying the two subsystems. Studies using the Probabilistic Risk Assessment methodology have shown that cross-tying the NIAS subsystems poses a smaller risk than operation with no safety grade back up control air for one division.

If a noninterruptible control air system subsystem becomes otherwise inoperable, the NIAS subsystem cross-tie must be closed to assure OPERABILITY of the remaining NIAS subsystem and the associated safety-related equipment. The ACTIONS specified in this situation carry out the ACTIONS for the resulting inoperabilities due to the loss of control air to equipment or instrument isolation valves.






DIAGRAM STATION & CONTROL AIR SYSTEM