GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

January 10, 1990
RBG- 32076
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 89-045 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

FOR J. E. Booker
Manager-River Bend Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TFP/RGW/DCH/JEV/pg

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Automatic Start of the Division I Standby Service Water Pumps Due to a Spurious Low Pressure Signal

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 2	1 2	8 9	8 9	0 4 5	0 0	0 1	1 0	9 0		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 1

POWER LEVEL (10): 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
L. A. England - Director, Nuclear Licensing	5 0 4 3 8 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 12, 1989 at 1205 with the unit operating at 100 percent power in Operational Condition 1, the Division I standby service water pumps received an automatic start signal due to a spurious low service water pressure signal when the normal service water pump 1SWP-P1A was secured. The signal was cleared and Division I standby service water system was restored to a normal lineup. This event is reported per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) as an event that resulted in an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.

This event resulted in the automatic initiation of both of the Division I standby service water (SSW) pumps which were not required since two of the normal service water pumps were operating. The SSW initiation performed as designed and therefore had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

REPORTED CONDITION

On December 12, 1989 at 1205 with the unit operating at 100 percent power in Operational Condition 1, the Division I standby service water pumps (*P*) received an automatic start signal due to a spurious low service water pressure signal when the normal service water pump 1SWP-P1A (*P*) was secured. The signal was cleared and Division I standby service water system (*BI*) was restored to a normal lineup. This event is reported per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) as an event that resulted in an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.

INVESTIGATION

Instrumention and Controls (I&C) personnel were performing a preventive maintenance task (P528890) to check the calibration of the normal service water supply pressure instrument, 1SWP-PS121. The normal service water pumps, 1SWP-P1B and 1SWP-P1C were in operation during this calibration. The normal service water pump, 1SWP-P1A was locked out to prevent it from automatically starting. Upon completion of the procedure, 1SWP-P1A was taken out of lockout, which caused the pump to automatically start. The system pressure with three normal service water pumps in operation was approximately 115 PSIG. The operating crew judged that it was not necessary to lock out the standby service water system when securing 1SWP-P1A since the actuation setpoint of the standby service water (SSW) system is 76 PSIG, approximately 40 PSIG below the system pressure at that time. When 1SWP-P1A was secured, a spurious low service water pressure signal was received by the Division I standby service water system which caused the automatic start of both SSW pumps, per design. The low pressure "seal in" was reset immediately and the standby service water system was restored to a normal lineup. The lowest pressure visually observed during this event was approximately 100 PSIG. Although this is well above the 76 PSIG needed to automatically start the standby service water system, apparently a short term pressure oscillation caused the initiation of the SSW pumps.

A similar event was reported in LER 87-031. In this case STP-200-0603, "Division III Remote Shutdown System Control Circuit Operability Test" was in progress. A low service water pressure signal followed the securing of standby service water pump, 1SWP*P2C. This pump restarted upon returning control to the main control room due to the "sealed in" low pressure start signal. The corrective action included the revision of the STP to include reset of all divisions of SSW low pressure initiation logic prior to returning the transfer switch to the normal position and upgrading the procedure to ensure that all "seal in" initiation signals for the SSW system are reset prior to returning equipment control to the main control room.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The procedure SOP-0018 "Normal Service Water System" has been revised to incorporate steps on how to reset an automatic start signal when "sealed in" on the normal service water pumps prior to taking a pump out of lock out. The applicable preventive maintenance task will be revised by January 31, 1990 to refer the operator to SOP-0018 upon completion to assure that the automatic initiation signal on the normal service water pumps will be reset per the procedure. In addition, a design modification (modification request (MR) 86-1542) is being considered to provide a time delay into the automatic initiation logic for the standby service water system in order to eliminate the problem.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event resulted in the automatic initiation of both of the Division I standby service water (SSW) pumps which were not required since two of the normal service water pumps were operating. The SSW initiation performed as designed and therefore had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).