



Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000

June 19, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director of USNRC
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-55/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-55/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

R. A. Uderitz
General Manager -
Nuclear Production

CC: Director, Office of Inspection
and Enforcement (30 copies)
Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
(3 copies)

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Report Number: 81-55/03L
Report Date: June 19, 1981
Occurrence Date: 5/21/81
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of #12 & 22 Station Power Transformers

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Reactor Power 28% - Unit Load 300 MW

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Action Statement 3.8.1.1a was entered at 0836 on May 21, 1981 when the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker was manually closed while in the test position. The closure of this breaker in the test position caused the inadvertent breaker closure relay protection to trip the No. 12 and No. 22 Station Power Transformers. The loss of the Transformers resulted in less than the minimum offsite A.C. electrical power sources required by the Technical Specifications. The reactor was tripped automatically as a result of loss of flow in No. 13 and No. 14 Reactor Coolant Loop.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Design deficiency. Operation of the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker for maintenance testing while the breaker was in the test position caused the loss of No. 12 and No. 22 Station Power Transformers. The inadvertent breaker closure circuit for No. 3 Unit was designed to allow testing of the relay protection with the generator in the test position.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires that with either an offsite circuit or diesel generator of the required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and be in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The power was restored to No. 12 and No. 22 Station Power Transformer at 0918 on May 21, 1981 and Action Statement 3.8.1.1a was terminated at this time.

A Design Change Request (LSC-0577) has been initiated to modify the breaker protection scheme to prevent recurrence of this incident. A caution tag has also been affixed to the breaker to instruct the operator not to manually close the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker in the test position.

In addition, Operating Memo OM-5 was revised to explain the above precaution.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By J. J. Espey

H. J. Midway
Manager - Salem Generating Station

SORC Meeting No. 81-50