

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 A L B R F 3 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

0 1 I 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 0 6 1 6 8 1 8 0 6 1 2 9 8 1 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation, the fire protection preaction sprinkler systems for reactor
0 3 building elevations 565, 593, and 621 were found isolated. (See T.S. 3.11.A.1.a)
0 4 There was no danger to the health or safety of the public. There were no previous
0 5 similar events. There are no redundant systems.

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0 7
0 8

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7 8 9
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 A 12 A 13 V A L V E X 14 H 15 D 16
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
8 1 0 2 9 0 1 T 0
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
H 18 G 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 22 N 24 L 25 M 4 7 5 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 54 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Lack of familiarity with the isolation valve operating characteristics caused
1 1 personnel to believe valve was open. The Mueller type AWWA valve was opened and the
1 2 systems were returned to normal. Personnel were familiarized with the isolation
1 3 valve characteristics. A precaution to verify the isolation valves are open will
1 4 be added to plant instructions.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
E 28 0 9 8 NA C 31 Inspector observed
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z 33 Z 34 NA NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80
1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 40 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80
1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
Z 42 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION
N 44 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

NRC USE ONLY

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 81029 Technical Specification Involved 3.11.A.1.a

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a(2) *Date due NRC: 6/30/81

Date of Occurrence 6/16/81 Time of Occurrence 1730 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The fire protection preaction sprinkler systems for reactor building elevations 565, 593, and 621 were found isolated. This system had been taken out of service the previous day and a patrolling fire watch established per T.S. 3.11.A.3. The hold order, under which this maintenance was performed was lifted. The valve was manually opened, subsequently, the system pressure was checked on the

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

(continued on attachment #2)

Unit 1 refueling outage

Unit 2 modification outage

Unit 3 at 98%

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

Established patrolling fire watch.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Lack of familiarity with the isolation valve operating characteristics.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity, no damage to the plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.

Corrective Action:

The valves were opened, returning the systems to normal, and personnel were familiarized with the isolation valve operating characteristics. A precaution to verify the valves are open will be added to plant instructions.

Failure Data:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision:

[Signature]

ATTACHMENT 2
LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
BFRO-50-296/81029

Identification and Description of Occurrence (Continued)

three elevations in the reactor building. He then notified the shift engineer that the system was in service and relieved the fire watch. It appears that the valves were not opened (there is no position indication on the valves) and that the observed pressure was the result of the system maintaining pressure due to the isolated condition. The pressure on the isolated portion subsequently bled down over a period of time and was noted to be low by an NRC inspector. At 1100 on the day the system pressure was noted low, the isolation valves were rechecked and found to be not fully opened. The isolation valves were fully opened and system pressure reestablished.