

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

81-615-032

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 13, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-269, -270, -287



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/81-4. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

  
William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management & Program Analysis  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
Post Office Box 10412  
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report Number: RC-269/81-4

Report Date: March 13, 1981

Occurrence Date: February 12, 1981

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Loss of EWST Level Indication

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 - cold shutdown  
Oconee 2 - ~ 0% (startup)  
Oconee 3 - cold shutdown

Description of Occurrence: At approximately 0208 on February 12, 1981, the primary level indication for the Elevated Water Storage Tank (EWST) was declared inoperable. Computer alarms on low water level in the EWST were received. A visual inspection of the control room indicator showed 0% water level, and the HPSW pumps were running due to automatic initiation on low level. An inspection of the Heise Gauge on the turbine building floor verified the EWST level at 100%. Investigation revealed that the air compressor which provides instrument air to level instrumentation was not running, and the air tank was at 0 psig. Loose connections were discovered on the motor contactor. After the connections were tightened, the compressor started normally, but would build up pressure only when the evacuation horn was valved out. It was discovered that the valves were sticking for the area evacuation horn. All solenoid valves for the evacuation horn were replaced, and the system was returned to service.

This incident constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.17.2.1 and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The primary cause of this incident was loose connectors on the air compressor starter terminals. A second significant cause was the sticking valves for the area evacuation horn.

Analysis of Occurrence: Units 1 and 3 were at cold shutdown and Unit 2 was at 0% power at the time of this incident. In addition, the EWST was verified full by use of the Heise Gauge in the turbine building. Both HPSW pumps were manually operable. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: All connections on the motor starter were tightened. Additionally, all solenoid valves for the area evacuation horn were replaced. Insulation will be installed on the exterior walls and ceiling of the air compressor room, and thermostatic control will be provided for the present heater. An air drier will be installed on the compressor to eliminate water in air lines.