

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 25, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

81-006-031

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/81-2. This report describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
PO Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/81-2

Report Date: February 25, 1981

Occurrence Date: February 11, 1981

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Electrical Penetration No. EMV-2 Failed to Hold SF₆ Gas Charge

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 75% FP

Description of Occurrence: During the Performance test for the Reactor Building Electrical Penetration SF₆ Gas Reading, it was noted that Electrical Penetration No. EMV-2 had a pressure reading of 0 PSIG. After several attempts to fill the penetration with SF₆ gas, it was determined that the penetration could not be pressurized.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this incident is a leak at the interior bushing. The exact cause will be determined when Unit 2 is shutdown to effect repairs.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the period of this incident, it was determined that the outside boundary of the electrical penetration was intact. A 10CFR50.59 evaluation was performed, and it was determined that operation with only a single containment barrier was permissible and was not an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation and determination was supported by the Duke Power Design Engineering group.

Corrective Action: Based on inspection, it was determined that the leakage of SF₆ gas was on the Reactor Building side. Reactor Building containment integrity was verified since one containment boundary still existed. A regulator on a SF₆ gas bottle was set to approximately 5 PSIG, and left hooked up to the penetration to ensure a positive pressure on the penetration. The penetration will be repaired or replaced during the next available outage.

The following surveillance program was started on February 12, 1981.

SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

The following program will be utilized to assure monitoring of the electrical penetration No. EMV-2.

An HP-210 "pancake" probe will be attached to the sheet metal enclosure around the penetration. Any leakage from the building through the penetration would concentrate in the enclosure and be detected by the probe. At the present time, the activity in the containment is significantly greater

than the activity in the penetration room. The activity in the penetration enclosure will be monitored no less than once a day. A method of performing a more accurate and/or frequent surveillance will be evaluated. Any improvements to the accuracy and/or frequency will be implemented.

On a daily basis, EMV-2 will be purged with SF_6 gas to prevent moisture buildup.

This surveillance program will continue until such a time as the Reactor is shutdown or the penetration is repaired.

The unit will not be operated with this situation for more than 30 days or after March 15, 1981.