

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 21, 1981

TELEPHONE AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-64. This report concerns the wrong semi-daily surveillance items checklists being conducted on two successive shifts. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
Post Office Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station



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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-64

Report Date: May 12, 1981

Occurrence Date: April 21, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: The wrong semi-daily surveillance items checklists were run on two successive shifts.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Mode 3, Hot Standby

Description of Occurrence: The wrong semi-daily surveillance items checklists were run on two successive shifts. At 1700 hours on April 21, 1981, the checklist for Mode 4 surveillances was run instead of the checklist for Mode 3. At 0600 hours on April 22, 1981, the checklist for Mode 1 surveillance was run instead of the checklist for Mode 3. This was reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.13c.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Personnel inadvertently used the wrong enclosures to run the semi-daily surveillance items periodic test.

Analysis of Occurrence: A periodic Test, Semi-Daily Surveillance Items, is used to verify the operability of various instrumentation and/or systems in the plant. It is performed twice daily; once between 0500 and 0800 hours and once between 1700 and 2000 hours. The periodic test consists of six enclosures; one checklist for each mode of operation. At 1700 hours on April 21, 1981, the checklist for Mode 4 surveillance was run instead of the checklist for Mode 3. After the checklist was completed, it was approved by the Shift Supervisor.

At 0600 hours on April 22, 1981, the checklist for Mode 1 surveillances was run instead of the checklist for Mode 3. After the checklist was completed, it was approved by the Shift Supervisor.

At approximately 1215 hours on April 22, a review of the semi-daily surveillance items checklists (1700 hours on April 21 and 0600 hours on April 22) was done and it was discovered that the wrong checklists had been run. The Shift Supervisor on duty was informed of the mistake and the correct checklist for Mode 3 was performed satisfactorily at 1350 hours. The normal schedule was resumed at 1915 hours when the checklist for Mode 3 was run satisfactorily.

Safety Analysis: Even though the wrong semi-daily surveillance items checklists were run, the surveillance items which were missed were being monitored regularly by the Control Room Operators since they are operating parameters. Thus, safe plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected. If the reactor had been at power, safety would not have been compromised since the missed parameters were monitored regularly by Control Room personnel. In addition, the correct checklist for Mode 3 was run at 1350 hours on April 22 and all parameters were satisfactory.

Corrective Action: The correct checklist for Mode 3, Semi-Daily Surveillance Items, was completed at 1350 hours on April 22, 1981. A meeting was held on April 24 in which all the Shift Supervisors were cautioned about thoroughly reviewing paperwork before they approved it.