

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | ALJMF1 | 200-0000-00 | 341111 | 4 | 5

REPORT SOURCE L6 | 05000348 | 7061081 | 3062381 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 | As a result of an inadvertent actuation of the fire protection deluge system on cooling  
03 | tower 2B, the levels in Fire Protection Tanks A and B fell to approximately 235,000  
04 | gallons each at 1600 on 6/10/81. Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications require a minimum  
05 | tank level of 250,000 gallons. Tech. Spec. 3.7.11.1 action statement requirements were  
06 | met. The health/safety of the public was not affected by this occurrence. (Note: This  
07 | LER is applicable to both Units 1 and 2 of FNP).

09 | AB 11 | A 12 | C 13 | ZZZZZZ 14 | Z 15 | Z 16

17 | 81 | 038 | 01 | T | 0

X18 | H19 | Z20 | Z21 | 0000 | Y23 | N24 | Z25 | Z9999 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 | The inadvertent actuation resulted during cooling tower maintenance activities. The  
11 | switchgear which supplies power to the cooling tower fire protection system air compressor  
12 | was de-energized in order to perform a battery replacement. In order to prevent fire  
13 | protection deluge system actuation with the air compressor inoperable, a temporary  
14 | nitrogen bottle was connected to the deluge system sensing lines. However, the nitrogen

15 | E28 | 100 29 | NA 30 | A31 | Operator observation 32

16 | Z33 | Z34 | NA 35 | NA 36

17 | 000 37 | Z38 | NA 39

18 | 000 40 | NA 41

19 | Z42 | NA 43

20 | N44 | NA 45

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

bottle outlet valve for 2B cooling tower deluge system was not opened. As a result, the clapper valve opened and the deluge system actuated. The tank levels were returned to minimum acceptable Technical Specification levels at 1845 on 6/10/81. This incident will be discussed during requalification training.