

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 19, 1981



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT - OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

The subject open item was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. W. Wright on October 24, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR's SQN EEB 8023 through SQN EEB 8042 (excluding SQN EEB 8034), SQN EEB
8045R1, SQN EEB 8051, SQN MEB 8007R1, and SQN NEB 8031 through SQN NEB
8034. Information concerning these items was submitted on November 25,
1980, and January 23, February 18, March 25, April 14, and April 28, 1981.
Enclosed is further information concerning two items. SQN EEB 8031R3 and
SQN EEB 8036R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last
report. We expect to submit our next report by August 21, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

Description of Item

During the review of qualification records for electrical equipment required by NUREG-0588, a number of components were identified as having inadequate documentation to verify their qualification levels for the harsh environments resulting from abnormal or accident conditions at the plant. A listing of the subject components was included in our last report.

Interim Progress

Since SQN EEB 8031R3 and SQN EEB 8036R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last report, the interim progress on only those two items is listed on the attachment to this report.

ATTACHMENT

<u>NCR No.</u>	<u>Component No.</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Corrective Action/Resolution</u>
SQNEEB8031R3	FIS-67-206	288A	ITT Barton	See response to SQNEEB8023R1.
	FIS-67-209	"	"	
	FIS-65-554A/B	"	"	These switches have been determined to be not qualified for the potentially harsh environment in which they are located. Based on the results of a safety evaluation, it was concluded that the components were not required to operate in the event of an accident. Therefore, TVA has modified the switch wiring (reference engineering change notice L5124) to remove those functions that, assuming failure of the switch in the harsh environment, could adversely affect the safety of plant operation.
	FIS-65-44E/F	"	"	
	FIS-65-25A/B	"	"	
	FIS-65-25C/D	"	"	
	FIS-65-31A/B	"	"	
	FIS-65-55C/D	"	"	
	FIS-65-44A/B	"	"	
	FIS-65-44C/D	"	"	
	FIS-65-25E/F	"	"	
	FIS-65-31C/D	"	"	
	FIS-70-81	"	"	
	PSID-313-305	"	"	
	PSID-313-340	"	"	
SQNEEB8036R2	FS-30-184	1627	F. W. Dwyer	See response to SQNEEB8023R1.
	FS-30-185	"	"	
	FS-30-192	"	"	
	FS-30-193	"	"	
	FS-30-157	"	"	
	FS-30-194	"	"	
	FS-30-195	"	"	
	FS-30-196	"	"	
	FS-30-197	"	"	
	FS-30-186	"	"	
	FS-30-202	"	"	
	FS-30-207	"	"	
	FS-30-201	"	"	
	FS-30-187	"	"	
	FS-30-200	"	"	Due to their location in the plant, these flow switches are not qualified for the postulated accident environment. Therefore, TVA will either relocate the switches in a more suitable environment or replace these components with qualified equipment before unit 2 initial criticality.
	FS-30-207	"	"	