

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
 /0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT
 SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/5/1/0/8/1/ (8) /0/6/1/0/8/1/ (9)
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On May 10, 1981 during Mode 5 operation, a blank flange was found to be in- /
 /0/3/ / stalled on the redundant hydrogen recombiner (1-HC-HC-1) return piping to Unit /
 /0/4/ / 2 containment. The hydrogen recombiner remained operable as required by T.S. /
 /0/5/ / 3.6.4.2 through a discharge path to the process ventilation system and to Unit /
 /0/6/ / No. 1 containment; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not /
 /0/7/ / affected. This item constitutes a loss of administrative control of an ESF /
 /0/8/ / system and is therefore reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c. /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/ /S/E/ (11)	/A/ (12)	/B/ (13)	/X/X/X/X/X/X/ (14)	/Z/ (15)
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE
(17)	/8/1/	/-/ /0/3/9/ / \ /	/0/3/	/L/ - /-/ /1/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/X/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/Z/9/9/9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The blank flange was installed during construction for the initial leak rate /
 /1/1/ / testing of Unit 2 containment penetration No. 31. When testing was completed, /
 /1/2/ / this blank flange was not removed. The blank flange was subsequently removed /
 /1/3/ / and the 1-HC-HC-1 return flow path to Unit 2 containment established. /
 /1/4/ /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /D/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ OPERATOR OBSERVATION /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / /

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Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #2
Docket No. 50-339
Report No. LER 81-039/03L-1

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Description of Event

On May 10, 1981 during Mode 5 operation, the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor noticed that a blank flange was installed on the discharge piping to Unit 2 containment from the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner (1-HC-HC-1). This blank flange was originally installed during pre-operational leakage testing of Unit 2 containment penetration. Since both hydrogen recombiners remained operable at all times as per T.S. 3.6.4.2, there was no effect on the health and safety of the general public.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The hydrogen recombiner is required for the removal of hydrogen released into the containment within 24 hours following a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident. Installed redundant piping systems provide suction and discharge piping to two skid-mounted hydrogen recombiners which are completely interchangeable. In addition, an alternate discharge path is provided for each recombiner to the gaseous waste system via the containment vacuum pump discharge line and another path to the alternate containment.

Cause of Event

This event was caused by inadequate administrative control of the pre-operational leakage testing of containment penetration No. 31.

Immediate Corrective Action

The blank flange was removed.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications of this event.