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REPORT SOURCE

1	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	1	7	0	4	1	5	3	1	8	0	6	0	9	8	1	9
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DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On April 15, 1981, during a review of Periodic Test (PT) procedures, it was determined

0 3 | that six containment isolation valves were not being tested in a manner which

0 4 | fully satisfies Technical Specification 4.4.2.a. On May 10, 1981, two additional

0 5 | valves were identified. Procedures developed to satisfy these requirements

0 6 | precluded the verification of operation of one contact in each valve control

0 7 | circuit. This event is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

08		7		8		9		80							
SYSTEM CODE				CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMP. SUBCODE				VALVE SUBCODE			
S F (11)				D (12)		Z (13)		V A L V E X (14)				X (15)			
9 10				11		12		13 18				19 20			
09		7		8		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.				OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.	
81		21		22		23		24 26		27		28 29		30 31	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	
17		8 1		G (18)		Z (19)		Z (20)		Z (21)		0 0 0 (22)		Y (23)	
21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS									
N (24)		N (25)		W 1 2 0 (26)		27									
42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Recent operating experience has verified that seven of the eight valves were functioning as designed. The eighth valve was tested and shown operable. In order to prevent recurrence, a PT is being revised to include provisions for fully testing the valves. This revision will be completed prior to the next scheduled performance of this PT (refueling outage).

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		
1	2	E	28	0	9	5	29	D	31	Review of Periodic Tests
ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE				
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	NA	35		
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	2	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA		
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION						
1	8	0	0	0	40			NA		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	9	Z	42			NA				
PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION				NRC USE ONLY		
2	0	N	44			NA				

NRC USE ONLY

(803) 383-4524

PHONE

F. M. Gilman

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-013, REV. 1

1. Cause Description and Analysis

On April 15, 1981, during a review of the H. B. Robinson Periodic Test (PT) procedures, it was determined that six containment isolation valves were not being tested in a manner which fully satisfied Technical Specification 4.4.2.a. On May 10, 1981, two additional valves were identified. These valves are: RMS-1, RMS-2, RMS-3, RMS-4, CVC-204A, CVC-204B, PCV-1716 and SI-855. These valves are tested for operability under the ISI Program. The containment isolation function is verified by a number of periodic tests; however, these test procedures do not require the above valves to be open prior to conducting the tests. As a result a contact in each valve control circuit which is required to open to initiate the auto closure upon an isolation signal is not tested by these procedures. Recent operating events have verified that each of these valves will close on the isolation signal, except SI-855 which was closed during the events. SI-855 is the containment isolation valve for the nitrogen supply to the SI accumulators. This valve which is operated from the control room is normally closed. In addition, there is one remotely operated valve downstream of SI-855 in each accumulator leg and manual valves upstream of the SI-855 valve which are also normally closed. These valves are manually operated as necessary to add nitrogen to the SI Accumulators. These valves are only opened for very short time periods (2-5 minutes per week) and under direct operator control. Additionally, the safeguard position for SI-855 as well as the other seven containment isolation valves above is procedurally verified by a control room status panel following initiation of SI. Therefore, there has been no undue risk to the public from this event. This event is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

2. Corrective Action

Recent plant conditions and operating events have required that these containment isolation valves respond to the Phase "A" isolation signal which has verified the operability of all the valves except SI-855 (normally closed). SI-855 was tested on June 5, 1981, and verified operable. Therefore, no additional immediate actions are necessary.

3. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence

A periodic test (PT-2.6) is being revised to include the above valves in the pretest valve lineup to insure full compliance with the surveillance requirements. This revision will be completed prior to the next refueling outage when the test is scheduled to be performed again.