



Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000

June 4, 1981



Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director of USNRC
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-54/01T

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-54/01T. This report is required within fourteen (14) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

RA Uderitz
R. A. Uderitz
General Manager -
Nuclear Production

CC: Director, Office of Inspection
and Enforcement (40 copies)
Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
(3 copies)

Report Number: 81-54/01T
Report Date: June 4, 1981
Occurrence Date: 5/21/81
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Volume Control Tank Level Control System

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Not Applicable

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

We have been informed by Westinghouse of a postulated plant operating condition which could result in a violation of current regulatory requirements regarding control and protection system interaction criteria. Westinghouse had previously notified the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on May 21, 1981 under 10CFR21.

The postulated situation involves a failure in the volume control tank level control system and a subsequent loss of suction to an operating centrifugal charging pump coupled with a single random failure of the remaining centrifugal charging pump.

The initial control system failure leads to diversion of letdown flow and loss of makeup to the VCT. Continued charging flow during this condition could lead to draining of the VCT and loss of suction with consequential pump damage if the operator does not terminate the event.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

This occurrence resulted from a Westinghouse analysis which concluded that regulatory requirements might not be met with respect to system interaction criteria.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Westinghouse analysis indicates that approximately ten minutes are available to the operator to terminate the assumed event prior to pump loss of suction. It is further concluded that, in the absence of automatic letdown isolation or re-alignment of the normal letdown path, core uncover would not occur until after approximately two days. Westinghouse has concluded that this item is not considered to involve serious safety implications.

It should also be noted that the Salem design includes an intermediate-head safety injection system which could be used as a backup to the high-head centrifugal charging pumps. It is our conclusion that the Salem design is adequate with respect to the operator's ability to recognize and terminate such an event, and that no serious safety implications exist.

June 4, 1981

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

In accordance with the recommendations of Westinghouse, we have reviewed the plant procedures and find them adequate with respect to prompt and proper operator response during such an event. In addition, all licensed operators will be informed of the potential problem and this information will be included in the Licensed Operator Requalification Program.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By J. J. Espey

HJ Midura /dy
Manager - Salem Generating Station

SORC Meeting No. 81-45