

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 M D C C N 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 8 7 0 2 0 4 8 1 8 0 3 0 4 8 1 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During Mode 6 operation at 2043 while conducting preventive maintenance,

0 3 lost shutdown cooling flow due to inadvertent deenergization of #21 120V

0 4 Vital AC Bus (T.S. 3.9.8). Deenergizing #21 120V Vital AC BLs caused

0 5 2-PIC-103 to deenergize, causing a shutdown cooling return header valve

0 6 to shut. At 2100, the bus was reenergized and flow restored. No opera-

0 7 tions were in progress involving an increase in reactor decay heat load

0 8 or reduction in RCS boron concentration. This is a non-repetitive event.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
E B 11 D 12 Z 13 C K T B R K 14 A 15 Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 3 1 0 0 4 0 3 L 0

18 ACTION TAKEN G 19 FUTURE ACTION Z 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 22 HOURS 0 0 0 0 23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 24 NPD-4 FORM SUB. N 25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I 0 0 5 25

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The preventive maintenance procedure in use by plant electricians did

1 1 not contain sufficient information. Procedures for Vital AC Inverters

1 2 and Back-up Bus components are being revised to include specifying the

1 3 required power source lineup necessary for conducting the maintenance.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 5 FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PUBLICATION ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 N 44 NA 8106090 563

NRC USE ONLY

LER NO. 81-04/3L
DOCKET NO. 50-318
LICENSE NO. DPR-69
EVENT DATE 02-04-81
REPORT DATE 03-04-81
ATTACHMENT

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (CONT'D)

During Mode 6 operation at 2043 while conducting preventive maintenance on No. 21 Vital A.C. Inverter, experienced a loss of shutdown cooling flow due to inadvertent deenergization of No. 21 120V Vital A.C. bus, (T.S. 3.9.8). With No. 21 120V Vital A.C. Bus on its backup power supply, a technician inadvertently opened the feeder breaker from the backup power supply, deenergizing No. 21 120V Vital A.C. Bus. This caused 2-PIC-103 to deenergize, which caused a shutdown cooling return header valve, SI-651 to shut. The operator then stopped No. 22 LPSI Pump. At 2100, No. 21 120V Vital A.C. Bus was reenergized and shutdown cooling flow restored. During this event, no operations were in progress involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. This event had no impact on the public health or safety. This is a non-repetitive event.