

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 T N S N P 1 7 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CONT  
 01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 7 0 5 0 4 8 1 8 0 5 2 9 8 1 9  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With Unit 1 at 60% RTP, pressurizer level pressure channel 1-L-68-339 was declared  
 03 inoperable at 0340 CST when the associated indicator was observed to be reading higher  
 04 than redundant channels. The trip bistable was tripped per action statement 7 of  
 05 LCO 3.3.1.1. At 1505 CST, auxiliary control room channels 1-L-68-325C and 326C were  
 06 also declared inoperable for the same reason, and action statement "a" of LCO 3.3.3.5  
 07 was entered. There was no effect on public health or safety. Reference: SORO-50-327/  
 08 81041, Revision 1.  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 I A 17 A 17 B 13 I N S T R U 14 T 15 Z 16  
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 1 1 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS ATTACHMENT NPD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT  
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD NO. SUBMITTED FORM SUB SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER  
 E 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 27 Y 23 N 24 N 25 B 0 8 0 47

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The reference legs were backfilled, calibration was verified, and the loops were  
 11 returned to service. During a subsequent unit outage, instrument mechanics discovered  
 12 an error in the sense line tubing to the condensate pot which accounted for the errors  
 13 experienced with the instrument loops. The error was corrected and the loops have been  
 14 returned to service.  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

15 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 E 28 0 6 0 29 NA A 31 Operator observation  
 16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA  
 17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA  
 18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 0 0 0 40 NA  
 19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 Z 42 NA  
 20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 N 44 NA

POOR ORIGINAL

Name of Preparer M. R. Harding/A. M. Wilkey

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6106080 306

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
SQRO-50-327/51050

In February 1981, DCR-P1036 was submitted to modify the tubing to the condensate pot in the sense lines for pressurizer level loops 1-L-68-325C, 326C, and 339. Tubing from the condensate pot to the pressurizer vapor sample line was to be added to allow noncondensable gases to escape from the pot so that the pot could function properly to maintain the required reference leg for the three level loops. This request was implemented by ECN L5392.

During a channel check performed on March 23, 1981, pressurizer level loop 1-L-68-339 was discovered to be indicating approximately 15% lower than redundant channels. The loop was declared inoperable and the associated reactor protection bistable was tripped in accordance with action 7 of LCO 3.3.1.1. Since auxiliary control room loops 1-L-68-325C and 1-L-68-326C shared a common sensing line with 1-L-68-339, they were also checked. After verifying that the two auxiliary control loops were also indicating approximately 15% low, the plant entered action statement "a" of LCO 3.3.3.5.

The error was diagnosed as an increased static head in the common reference leg for the loop transmitters. The 15% error was attributed to an accumulation of water in the tubing added by ECN L5392.

To compensate for the increased static head, the pressurizer high level trip bistable setpoint was shifted from 92% to 76%. In addition, temporary scales were installed on main control room indicators to enable operators to obtain direct readings. The auxiliary control room loops were retubed to the sensing line for 1-L-68-339, which did not have the sense line modification (ECN L5392).

On April 2, 1981, a channel check of 1-L-68-339 revealed that loop to be indicating approximately 8% high. Since this indicated that previous corrective action was not adequate, the loop was declared inoperable and the associated bistable tripped in accordance with action statement 7 of LCO 3.3.1.1. A return to the premodification configuration was planned for the next unit outage.

On April 17, 1981, auxiliary control room loops 1-L-68-325C and 1-L-68-326C were observed to be reading approximately 15% high. The plant again entered action statement "a" of LCO 3.3.3.5.

During the subsequent unit outage, the sense lines for 1-L-68-339, 1-L-68-325C, and 1-L-68-326C were returned to their premodification configuration. Since this configuration was susceptible to variations in the reference leg static head, the loops were monitored closely and refilled as necessary. Since losses of condensate in the reference leg resulted in higher (than actual) pressurizer level signals, the limiting safety system setting of  $\leq 93\%$  was not compromised.

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
(Continued)

On May 4, 1981, pressurizer level channels 1-L-68-339, 325C, and 326C were again declared low when they were observed to be reading higher than redundant channels. The reference legs were backfilled, calibration verified, and the loops were returned to service that same day.

During a subsequent unit outage, instrument mechanics discovered that sense line tubing to the condensate pot for the instrument loops had been reversed inside a wall penetration. The line from the bottom of the condensate pot was tubed to the vent line and the line from the top of the pot was tubed to the instrument loop transmitters. The tubing error had prevented proper operation of the condensate pot which had resulted in erroneous level indications.

The tubing error was corrected on May 13-14, 1981, and the loops were returned to service. A modification on the condensate pots has been requested (DCR-1120) to improve their operation. A similar modification to the Unit 2 pressurizer loops was performed and verified during Unit 2 hot functional testing.