




# Public Service Company of Colorado

16805 ROAD 19½  
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

April 9, 1981  
Fort St. Vrain  
Unit No. 1  
P-81119



Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive  
Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012

Reference: Facility Operating License  
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

Enclosed please find a copy of Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/81-022, Final, submitted per the requirements of Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

Also, please find enclosed one copy of the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/81-022.

Very truly yours,

*Don Warembourg*

Don Warembourg  
Manager, Nuclear Production

DW/clg

Enclosure

cc: Director, MIPC

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REPORT DATE: April 9, 1981  
Determined  
OCCURRENCE DATE: March 10, 1981

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-022  
ISSUE 0  
Page 1 of 4

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO  
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2  
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/81-022/03-L-0

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF  
OCCURRENCE:

On March 10, 1981, it was determined that the total dissolved solids in the plant non-radioactive liquid effluent exceeded 2300 parts per million on February 24, 1981. This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2 as a degraded mode of LCO NR 1.1.

EVENT  
DESCRIPTION:

On several previous occasions, the non-radioactive liquid effluent has exceeded the LCO NR 1.1 limit for residual chlorine. These events were reported in Reportable Occurrences 79-61, 80-28, and 81-004. Because of the difficulty in obtaining the exact chlorination required by the system, plant operations have been modified to include closing the blowdown discharge valve (1) (see Figure 1) from the circulating water system during chlorination to prevent inadvertent discharge of any high residual chlorine to the Goosequill ditch. To maintain minimum blowdown rate requirements during the chlorination, the raw water bypass valve (2) was opened to make up the lost flow.

On Friday, February 20, 1981, this was done during the regular chlorination of the circulating water system; however, following the chlorination, the blowdown discharge valve (1) was not re-opened. This resulted in the continued concentration of total dissolved solids in the circulating water system due to evaporation. The circulating water system was sampled Tuesday, February 24, 1981, and the total dissolved solids were found to be high. The blowdown valve (1) was fully opened, and the blowdown of the circulating water system continued at this rate for approximately two hours when it was noted that the Goosequill total dissolved solids was 3175 parts per million was in excess of the LCO NR 1.1 limit of 2300 parts per million. The blowdown rate was adjusted to reduce the total dissolved solids being discharged to the plant effluent and the liquid effluent was within required chemical limits by the next shift. The blowdown was continued and has maintained the total dissolved solids within acceptable limits. The water discharged to the Goosequill ditch during this event followed the regular discharge

**POOR ORIGINAL**

path from the Goosequill ditch to the farm ponds. The farm pond level was low and it appears unlikely any of this water was discharged to the South Platte River.

CAUSE

DESCRIPTION:

High total dissolved solids in the plant non-radioactive liquid effluent was the result of two problems:

1. Excessive build-up of total dissolved solids in the circulating water system between February 20 and 24, 1981, due to no system blowdown during this period.
2. The following blowdown of the systems on Tuesday, February 24, 1981, at a rate greater than the dilution capability of the Goosequill ditch flow.

CORRECTIVE

ACTION:

Circulating water system blowdown was adjusted to a lower rate, and the total dissolved solids returned to acceptable values by the time of the next sample.

This occurrence will be reviewed by the Plant Review Panel to determine the need for further corrective action in terms of the procedures and individuals involved.

No further corrective action is anticipated or required.

**POOR ORIGINAL**




FIGURE 1



Prepared By: Asa B. Reed  
Asa B. Reed  
Technical Services Technician

Reviewed By: J. W. Gahm  
J. W. Gahm  
Technical Services Supervisor

Reviewed By: Don Warembourg for F. Mathie  
Frank M. Mathie  
Operations Manager

Approved by: Don Warembourg  
Don Warembourg  
Manager, Nuclear Production