

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CGN'T

REPORT SOURCE: 0 1 7 8

DOCKET NUMBER: L (3) 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 (7) 0 5 1 3 8 1 (8) 0 5 2 2 8 1 (9)

EVENT DATE: 60 61 68 69 74 75

REPORT DATE: 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While evaluating the failure of RIP isolation valve, X-206D position D to open, it

0 3 | was discovered that the isolation of the affected ECCS actuation instrument,

0 4 | E41-LSH-NO15B had not been recognized and the appropriate action statement followed.

0 5 | This is one of two instruments used to shift HPCI suction to the torus on a high

0 6 | torus level. The other switch was operable. This event did not affect the health

0 7 | or safety of the public.

08 Technical Specification 3.3.3, 6.9.1.8b 80

0	9	SYSTEM CODE S D		11	CAUSE CODE A	12	CAUSE SUBCODE A	13	COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U				14	COMP SUBCODE S	15	VALVE SUBCODE Z	16										
7	8	9	10		11		12		13				14	15		16											
17		EVENT YEAR 8 1		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 8		24	25	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		28	29	REPORT TYPE T		30	31	REVISION NO. 0		32							
ACTION TAKEN H		18	FUTURE ACTION Z		19	EFFECT ON PLANT Z		20	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		21	HOURS 0 0 0 0		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		23	NPRO-4 FORM SUB Y		24	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N		25	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER X 9 9 9		26	27
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | A failure to recognize the isolation of the instrument due to emphasis placed on

1 1 | returning the isolation valve to service caused this event. The valve control switch

1 2 | was replaced and the valve was returned to service within 2.25 hours, which returned

1 3 | the instrument to service. The involved person has been counseled concerning the

1 4 | importance of technical specification awareness when a piece of equipment is inoperable.

1 5 F 28 0 6 2 29 NA C 31 Special Investigation 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 10 34 NA

7 8 9 11 44

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

45 50

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

51 52

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) NA	(39)			

PERSONNEL INJURIES										
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION						
1	4	0	0	0	40	NA				

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 2 12 NA

PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		8106010423		NA		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	44								
7	8	9	10							68	69

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr.

PHONE (919) 457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-81-48

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 5/13/81

This event occurred as a result of a personnel error on the part of the duty Shift Foreman who failed to recognize the isolation of the affected instrument, and take the appropriate corrective actions specified in the technical specifications.

While performing PT 3.1.11PC, RIP isolation valve, X-206D position D failed in the closed position due to a broken control switch, Master Specialities, Model No. 10EF4, on the reactor turbine gauge board.

An examination of the control switch revealed a broken bakelite pivot piece which prevented the switch actuation plunger from resetting the switch contacts after the valve was closed. The broken control switch was then replaced, satisfactorily tested, and the valve was reopened approximately 2.25 hours after the switch failure.

While investigating the valve closure failure, it was discovered through an examination of plant documentation that the isolation of the affected instrument, 2-E41-LSH-N015B, had not been identified and that the applicable action statement as specified in the technical specification had not been performed.

The closing of the RIP isolation valve isolated one of two suppression pool level instruments that transfers HPCI suction point from the condensate storage tank to the suppression chamber on receipt of a high level signal from the suppression pool. The other switch which transfers the HPCI suction on a high suppression pool level was operable and both switches which shift the HPCI suction to the suppression pool on a low condensate storage tank level were operable.

Due to emphasis placed on returning the RIP isolation valve to normal operation, the isolation of the N015B level switch was overlooked. The involved Shift Foreman has been specifically counseled to be constantly aware of all aspects pertaining to technical specifications when plant equipment or components are inoperable or out of service. In addition, all shift licensed personnel will review this LER to ensure their awareness of this concern.