

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Update Report; Previous Report Date 6-10-80
(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60									
G A E I H 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5									
L I C E N S E E C O D E L I C E N S E N U M B E R L I C E N S E T Y P E C A T 5 8									
CON'T									
REPORT SOURCE 1 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 5 2 9 8 0 8 0 5 2 1 8 1 9									
D O C K E T N U M B E R E V E N T D A T E R E P O R T D A T E									
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10									
0 2 With the Unit 1 reactor shutdown to repair the RHR inboard injection									
0 3 valve the site engineering staff confirmed that a cable separation prob-									
0 4 lem, FSAR section 8.8.3.5.10, exists relating to the containment atmos-									
0 5 pheric control system. There were no effects upon public health and									
0 6 safety. Redundant systems were available and operable. This is a rep-									
0 7 etitive event - see LER 50-321/1979-076.									
0 8									
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE									
0 9 S E 11 B 12 C 13 E L E C T R O N 14 Z 15 Z 16									
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.									
17 18 10 19 0 5 4 20 1 21 X 22 1									
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER									
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26									
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27									
10 This event can be attributed to both a design and an installation error.									
11 The design specified that two conduits be connected to a dual element									
12 RTD which has only one place to connect conduit. So, during installa-									
13 tion it was apparently decided to reroute the related cable through the									
14 existing conduit. A DCR has been written to modify the cable routing.									
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
15 G 28 0 0 0 0 29 NA 30 D 31 Notification from AE 32									
ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE									
16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36									
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION									
17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39									
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION									
18 0 0 0 40 NA 41									
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION									
19 Z 42 NA 43									
PUBLICATION DESCRIPTION									
20 N 44 NA 45									
NRC USE ONLY									
8105290 278									
NAME OF PREPARED C. L. Coggin, Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv. PHONE 912-367-7851									

LER #: 50-321/1980-054, Rev. 1
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1980-054, Rev. 1

On 5-29-80, with the Unit 1 reactor shutdown to repair the RHR inboard injection valve E11-F015B the site engineering staff performed a cable walkdown which confirmed that a cable separation problem exists within the containment atmospheric control system "T48". Earlier the architect engineers, while reviewing their computerized circuit and raceway schedule error messages for Unit 1, received a couple of cable separation errors relating to the "T48" system. They, in turn, notified the plant per proposed design change request #PS1E-80-001.

The cables in question H21-P173-C010 and H21-P173-C013 (non-divisional) have been routed through both essential division I and II type raceways. This event is addressed in the FSAR section 8.8.3.5.10 control system since no computer routing errors have been received pertaining to the Unit 2 system. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to the event. Redundant systems were available and operable. This is a repetitive occurrence relating to cable separation problems, refer to LER #50-321/1979-076 and 50-366/1979-098 for Unit 1 and 2, respectively.

This event can be attributed to a combination of design and installation type errors. The design indicated that two separate conduits could be connected to the dual RTD unit for temperature elements T48-N072 and T48-N009C when actually only one conduit can be connected to the unit. The same situation applies to temperature elements T48-N073 and T48-N009G. During the installation phase of the cable, the personnel apparently realized that they could not connect the two conduits to the same RTD unit; therefore, they rerouted the associated cables so that only one conduit was connected to each RTD unit. This change required that the affected cables (non-divisional) be routed the last few feet in essential division I conduits. The problem was that the nondivisional cables had already been routed in essential division II raceways earlier in their routing.

Upon confirmation of this event a design change request, 80-166, was written to have the cables rerouted. The affected cables will be rerouted when the design has been completed and the required parts are on site.

DCR 80-166 was originally scheduled for implementation during the current 1981 refueling outage. However, complete engineering design package has not been received on site. Work will commence following receipt of a complete design package.