

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 GAEIH1 200-00000-00 3411111 4 5

CON'T  
01 REPORT SOURCE L60500321 7050681 8051981 9

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 On 5-6-81, with Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling/torus modification out-  
03 age, the AE conducted a surveillance walkdown of pipe supports per IEB  
04 79-14 and then notified the site that a total of 23 supports had failed  
05 the support functionality criteria for IEB 79-14. This is a repetitive  
06 occurrence; see LER 50-321/1981-039. There were no effects on public  
07 health or safety. No systems operabilities were affected.

08 1

09 SYSTEM CODE WA 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE SUPORT 14 COMP. SUBCODE B 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 81 21 22 EVENT YEAR 81 23 24 25 26 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 041 27 28 29 OCCURRENCE CODE 01 30 31 REPORT TYPE T 32 33 34 REVISION NO. 0

18 19 ACTION TAKEN XA 20 21 FUTURE ACTION ZZ 22 23 EFFECT ON PLANT ZZ 24 25 SHUTDOWN METHOD ZZ 26 27 HOURS 0000 28 29 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 30 31 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y 32 33 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 34 35 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B209 36

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The design requirements of the supports were exceeded. Overall, six  
11 types of failures were detected. The supports will be modified or rep-  
12 laced as necessary prior to Unit 1 startup such that the requirements  
13 of Tech Specs 6.9.1.8.i are satisfied.

14 1

15 FACILITY STATUS G 28 29 30 31 % POWER 000 32 33 34 35 OTHER STATUS NA 36 37 38 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 39 40 41 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance of pipe supports

16 23 24 25 26 27 ACTIVITY CONTENT ZZ 28 29 30 31 RELEASED OF RELEASE NA 32 33 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 36 37 38 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA

17 000 37 38 39 40 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 41 42 43 TYPE Z 44 45 DESCRIPTION NA

18 000 43 44 45 46 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 47 48 49 50 DESCRIPTION NA

19 Z 42 43 44 45 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 46 47 48 49 50 DESCRIPTION NA

20 N 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 PUBLICITY ISSUED NA

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8105290 253

LER #: 50-321/1981-041  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-321/1981-041

On 5-6-81, with Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling/torus modification outage, the AE conducted a surveillance walkdown of pipe supports per IEB 79-14 and notified the site that a total of 23 supports had failed the support functionality criteria for IEB 79-14. The supports and associated types of failures are as follows:

Pipe Support Failures of Functionality Requirements

1. B21-X29-H800: Spring is bottomed out.
2. B21-X29-H804: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
3. B31-H001: The support does not act in the designed direction.
4. T45-H002: Support is not carrying the weight load of the pipe.
5. N11-MSH-1: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
6. N11-MSH-2: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
7. N11-MSH-16: Deflection of the support resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds 1/4".
8. N11-MSH-43: Load in the standard support component (hydraulic snubber) exceeds the MFGRs recommended allowable based on the pressure relief valve setting for the unit.
9. N11-MSH-46: Load in the standard support component (hydraulic snubber) exceeds the MFGRs recommended allowable based on the pressure relief valve setting for the unit.
10. N11-MSH-47: Load in the standard support component (hydraulic snubber) exceeds the MFGRs recommended allowable based on the pressure relief valve setting for the unit.
11. P41-SWH-10: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
12. P41-SWH-92: Deflection of the support resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds 1/4".
13. P41-SWH-101: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.

14. P41-SWH-102: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
15. P41-SWH-105: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
16. P41-SWH-113: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
17. P41-SWH-116: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
18. P41-SWH-119: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
19. P41-SWH-150: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
20. P41-SWH-153: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
21. P41-SWH-154: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
22. P41-SWH-157: Stress in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeds the material yield stress.
23. P41-SWH-165B: The support is not acting in the analyzed direction.

This is a repetitive occurrence; see LER 50-321/1981-039. There were no effects on public health or safety. No systems operabilities were affected.

The support functionality criteria failures occurred because the design requirements of the supports were exceeded. Six types of failures were detected in the twenty-three supports:

1. Some supports have stresses in structural members resulting from weight plus DBE seismic loads exceeding the materials yield stresses.
2. Spring bottomed out.
3. Supports not acting in analyzed and designed directions.
4. Support not carrying the weight load of pipe.
5. Deflection of support resulting from weight plus DBE.
6. The load in the standard support component (hydraulic snubber) exceeds the manufacturer's recommended allowable based on the pressure relief valve setting for the unit. The supports will be modified or replaced as necessary prior to Unit 1's startup such that the requirements of Tech Specs 6.9.1.8.i are satisfied.