LES-19-157-NRC

NOV 0 1 2019



Attn: Document Control Desk Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

> Louisiana Energy Services, LLC License Number: SNM-2010 NRC Docket Number: 70-3103

Subject: 60 Day Written Follow-up Report for Event Notification 54324

On October 10, 2019 Louisiana Energy Services, LLC dba URENCO USA (UUSA), submitted Event Notification 54324 to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a). As required by 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b), UUSA is providing this letter which contains the 60 day written follow-up to the initial report.

Enclosure 1 contains the written content of the notification submitted on October 10, 2019. Enclosure 2 of this letter contains additional information. Together, these enclosures contain the content required by 10 CFR 70.50(c).

If you have any questions, please contact Scott Diggs, Acting Licensing and Performance Assessment Manager at 575-394-6203.

Respectfully,

YIMO)

Stephen Cowne Chief Nuclear Officer and Compliance Manager

Enclosures: 1. Event Report Notification 54324 2. Written Follow-up Report

IE72 NM5520 NM55

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CC:

Kevin Ramsey, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Kevin.Ramsey@NRC.gov

Jacob Zimmerman, Enrichment & Conversion Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Jacob.Zimmerman@NRC.gov

Robert Williams, Branch Chief – Senior Projects Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission <u>Robert Williams@NRC.gov</u>

ENCLOSURE 1

Event Report Notification 54324

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NRC FORM 361A				U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION					LICENSE NUMBER		
(8-2010)	SNM-2010										
REPORT TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION					NAME OF CALLER				CALL BACK TELEPHONE NO.		
1735 EDT	Louisiana Ener	rgy Services, LLC (URENCO US				A) Jim Rickman				(575) 394-6558	
EVENT TIME	LOCATION OF EVENT (Include County and				I State) POF		PORTION OF PL	ANT AFFEC	TED		
10:30 AM MD	06/06/2018 Lea County New Mexico				SBM 1001 Autoclave						
EVENT CLAS	SIFICATIONS	EV		INCIDENT REP		EPORTS	(30.50, 40.60, 70.50)				
GENERAL EMERGENCY *				2	20.2201	LOSS / TH	HEFT	(a)	PROTECTIVE ACTION PREVENTED		
		MEDICAL / ACADEMIC		2	20.2202	ACTUAL / OVEREX	THREATENED	(b)(1	UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION		
ALERT					2	20.2202	ACTUAL / RELEASE		(b)(2	2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE	
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT *		WASTE MANAGEMENT			2	21. 21	DEFECT / NONCOM	/ IPLIANCE	(b)(3	B) MEDICAL TREATMENT WITH CONTAMINATION	
		INDUSTRIAL / COMMERCIAL			2	26.719	FITNESS	FOR DUTY	(b)(4) FIRE / EXPLOSION	
TRANSPORTATION EVENT					3	35.3045 MEDICAL EVENT			2 CRITICALITY / SNM LOST		
		OTHER (Specify)			_ з	36.83 IRRADIATOR EVENT		70.5	2 ACTUAL / ATTEMPTED THEFT		
OTHER (Specify)					3	39.77 RUPTURED WELL LOGGING SOURCE		CRITICALITY CONTROL 4-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01)			
10 CFR 70 Appendix A Criteria b.2					3	39.77 IRRETRIEVABLE WELL LOGGING SOURCE		CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01)			
* ONLY UNDER OLD 1981 ORDER					4	10.26	TAILINGS DAM FAIL) / WASTE .URE	от⊦	IER NON-CFR REQUIREMENT	
NOTIFICATIONS		YES	YES NO WILL BE		ANYTHING UNUSUAL		OR		S (Explain below)		
NRC REGION?				X	NOT L	NOT UNDERSTOOD?		X NO			
STATE?			X			ALL SYSTEMS FU		INCTION	X YES	3	
LOCAL?					AS RE	AS REQUIRED?				(Explain below)	
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES?			X					YES	6		
PRESS RELEAS	E?		X		ON PAGE 2?			X NO			

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continue on Page 2 if necessary)

EN 54324

On October 10, 2019 at approximately 6:30 PM, a responsible individual at Louisiana Energy Services LLC, dba URENCO USA was informed that on June 5th, 2018, at approximately 4:00 PM MDT, pressure instrument isolation valve, 1001-471-1A12, was found open when it should have been shut to maintain the pressure boundary of autoclave 1LS1. The autoclave is used to homogenize UF6 and obtain samples. The autoclave pressure boundary forms IROFS10.

Prior to the event, on May 31 2018, annual maintenance was performed on the autoclave as required by the IROFS10 surveillance requirements. Subsequently, a homogenization and UF6 sampling was performed June 1st through June 5th on a 30B cylinder of UF6. During preparations for a subsequent homogenization cycle, valve 1001-471-1A12 was found open. The valve should have remained closed from the previous homogenization. There was not an initiating event (no release of UF6) and no initiation of an accident sequence. The valve has been shut and the IROFS boundary has been restored. The plant is in a safe configuration.

This event has been identified in UUSA's corrective action program as EV 133619 and a causal investigation is planned.

End of report.

RADIOLOGICAL / CHEMICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS													
ISOTOPE	ACTIVITY	PHYSICAL FORM	CHEMICAL FORM		STACK	LIQUID EFFLUENT	OTHER						
				MONITOR READING									
			·	ALARM SETPOINT	<u>+</u>								
		·	·										
	RELEASE	PERSONNEL EXPOSURE / CONTAMINATION DATA											
	ED RELEASE	NUMBER OF PERS	SONNEL EXPOSED:	:	NUMBER OF PE	ERSONNEL CONTAMINA	ATED:						
	ELEASE		NAL DOSE:			MAXIMUM EXTERNAL LEVEL:							
ONSITE ARI	EAS EVACUATED	MAXIMUM INTERN	IAL DOSE:		MAXIMUM INTE	RNAL LEVEL:							
OFFSITE PROTECTIVE		CRITICAL ORGAN	(if known):		CIRITIAL ORGA	N (if known):							
	DEGRADED CF	RITICALITY SAF	ITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS FOR ACCIDENT SCENARIO(S) (BULLETIN 91-01)										
ALL CONTR		ALL BUT SINGLE CONTROLS LOST	DEFICIENT S	SAFETY SAFETY	Y SIGNIFICANCE	>45% MINIMUM C PRESENT OR REA	RITICAL MASS ADILY AVAILABLE						
NUMBER AND TYP	ES OF CONTROLS	NECESSARY UNDEF											
NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS													
	SE OF CONTROLS	NECESSARY TO RE	STORE & SAFE SIT										
	ED UP CONTROLL	NEUESSANT TO THE	SIUREA Oni E U	UATION									
SAFETY SIGNIFIC	ANCE OF EVENTS												
Ora El T. C. L.													
SAFETY EQUIPME	NT STATUS												
STATUS OF CORR	RECTIVE ACTIONS												
EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)													
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ENCLOSURE 2

Written Follow-up Report

Written Follow-up Report

- I. Applicable information required by 10 CFR 70.50(c)(2)
 - a. The probable cause of the event, including all factors that contributed to the event and the manufacturer and model number (if applicable) of any equipment that failed or malfunctions is provided below:
 - i. UUSA has determined that the causes are the same as the event described in EN54101. As such, the investigation determined that the apparent cause was complacency due to infrequent operation of the 1001-471-1A12 isolation valve. The contributing causes were;
 - 1. Improper verification of valve positions by use of visual verification –vshands on verification.
 - 2. MA-3-2470-01, Autoclave Leak Check Surveillance IROFS10, leaves the valves out of their normal position
 - 3. Steps that ensure integrity of IROFS10 and 28 in OP-3-0470-01 are not flagged as critical steps and commitment steps
 - 4. Valves that are not usually operated makeup the IROFS10 established boundary
 - 5. Steps that ensure integrity of IROFS are not flagged as critical steps and commitment steps
 - 6. Not all personnel are aware of the impact their day to day jobs may have on the safety function of IROFS
 - b. Corrective actions taken or planned to prevent occurrence of similar or identical events in the future and the results of any evaluations or assessments are:
 - i. UUSA has determined that the corrective actions are the same as the event described in EN54101. The operators will receive coaching on the dangers of complacency when doing routine evolutions. The planned corrective actions that will strengthen the robustness of the IROFS10 boundaries include retraining the operators in the preferred method of performing valve verifications and procedural enhancements to minimize the probability of recurrence.
 - c. UUSA is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70; therefore, a discussion of whether the condition was identified and evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is provided below:
 - i. The IROFS was identified in the UUSA ISA as a safety control to mitigate the consequences of a release of UF6 within the autoclave. The ISA evaluated accident sequences that could result in consequences to the workers and public. The valve was determined to be needed to mitigate the adverse consequences to workers and public.