



## Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION  
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321  
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS790365

August 3, 1979

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza  
Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.1 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on July 6, 1979. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-79-18  
Report Date: August 3, 1979  
Occurrence Date: July 6, 1979  
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station  
Brownville, Nebraska 68321

### Identification of Occurrence:

Operation with an engineered safety feature instrument setting less conservative than those established in Table 3.2.A of the Technical Specifications.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The reactor was operating at a steady state power level of approximately 95% of rated thermal power.

### Description of Occurrence:

While performing routine Surveillance Test Procedure 6.2.1.7, the level indicating switch NBI-LIS-58A auxiliary switch number one setpoint was found set at a level lower than allowed by Technical Specifications.

### Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Examination of NBI-LIS-58A revealed a small amount of sediment consisting of dust and moisture. This allowed the subject auxiliary switch assembly to become slightly sluggish resulting in an out of tolerance setpoint.

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Analysis of Occurrence:

NBI-LIS-57A and 58A are Yarway Model 4418C level indicators and are installed as redundant level indicating switches with two sets of auxiliary switches each, designated one and two respectively. Auxiliary switch number one initiates a MSIV closure at a reactor vessel level of  $\geq -37$  inches. Auxiliary switch number two initiates a ATWS reactor recirculation pump trip at a reactor vessel level of  $\geq -37$  inches.

The subject level indicator was indicating properly and auxiliary switch number two would have initiated a ATWS reactor recirculation pump trip if the reactor vessel water level had decreased to the setpoint. Redundant NBI-LIS-57A was also operable and would have initiated the MSIV closure associated with auxiliary switch number one if the reactor vessel water level had decreased to the setpoint.

The equipment history for NBI-LIS-58A revealed that a similar problem had previously occurred and auxiliary switch number two had been replaced. In addition, the case containing the two auxiliary switches had been sealed to prevent intrusion of dust and moisture. It is believed that the sediment found in this occurrence is a latent affect from the previous identified problem in that the casing was not thoroughly cleaned prior to sealing. This occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

The interior of the switch was thoroughly cleaned and proper operation of the auxiliary switches was verified. Both LIS casings were inspected to insure they were tightly sealed to prevent moisture intrusion of the auxiliary switch. Surveillance Test Procedure 6.2.1.7 was performed this date and NBI-LIS-58A auxiliary switch one and two were verified operable at the specified setpoint. Additionally, a new mechanical cam actuated solid state switch module is available from Yarway and this modification is currently under evaluation for future installation. This occurrence has been discussed with all personnel involved.

Sincerely,

*L. C. Lessor*

L. C. Lessor  
Station Superintendent  
Cooper Nuclear Station

LCL:cg  
Attach.

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