PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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March 5, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on February 19, 1979.

Reference:	Docket Number 50-277
Report No:	LER 2-79-008/1T-0
Report Date:	March 5, 1979
Occurrence Date:	February 19, 1979
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Facility Operating License DPR-44 which authorizes thermal power production up to 3293 MWt.

Description of the Event:

Unit 2 had just completed a preconditioning ramp to rated power. An electrical load of 1095 MWe was indicated on the P-1 computer printout at the same time the P-1 indicated 3252 MWt. Power was increased slowly until 7:45 PM on 2/18/79. At that time, the P-1 indicated 3287 MWt and 1112 MWe. A check of the Unit 2 electrical demand tape at that time indicated an electrical load of 1124 MWe. When the electrical versus thermal power discrepancy was recognized, steps were taken to establish an electrical load of approximately 1092 MWe indicated on the P-1. P-1 surveillance experience, up to the time of the event,

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demonstrated that 1092 MWe corresponded to 100% rated core thermal power. After this had been accomplished, the APRMs read about 1.9 percent below rated power. The APRM gains were increased so that the indicated power would be 100 percent at that load. The core parameters of importance (MCPR, MAPLHGR, MFLPD) with regard to fuel integrity were calculated by the station reactor engineer to have remained within their respective limits during the overpower period. The reactor thermal limit was exceeded for a period of about six (6) hours.

Consequences of Event:

None of the above core parameters were exceeded as noted. The scram setpoints were subsequently verified to be 2.5% low. Given the estimated 2% overpower condition, a high flux scram would have therefore occurred within the Technical Specification limits. Hence, the safety significance associated with this event is minimal.

Cause of Event:

Erroneous feedwater flow input to the computer caused the reactor P-1 thermal power calculation (heat balance) to indicate less than the actual power level.

Corrective Action:

A. Reduce reactor power to a point which was known to be within the thermal license limits.

B. Adjust APRM gains so that they indicated 100 percent power at this lower thermal power.

C. Recalibrated the feedwater flow inputs to the computer.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:

Operators and supervision have been instructed to halt any power increases if the computer printouts and other indications show that there may be a mismatch between electrical and thermal power which from operating experience appears to be incorrect. If such a mismatch occurs, further power increases are to be halted unless plant management gives the approval for them.

Yours truly,

M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman M. Heller, NRC - Office of Management & Program Analysis