

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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June 1, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman,
Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on May 17, 1979.

Reference: Docket Number 50-277
50-278

Report No: LER 2-79-24/1T-0
Report Date: June 1, 1979
Occurrence Date: May 17, 1979
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Units 2 and 3
R.D. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 6.9.2a(9) requires reporting
"Performance of structures, systems, or components that require
remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a
manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in
the safety analysis report or technical specification bases; or
discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically
considered in the safety analysis report or technical
specifications that require remedial action or corrective
measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe
condition."

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Description of the Event:

During the investigation of Bulletin 79-04, the outboard CRD return line for each unit was found not to be seismically qualified.

Consequences of Event:

The control rod drive system has been operated at Peach Bottom with the return line to the reactor isolated for the last 2 operating cycles and is therefore inactive. The CRD system is fully operational in this mode. The CRD return line piping inside containment is seismically qualified. The inboard containment isolation check valve in the CRD return line is closed in the present mode of operation. This check valve, as well as the outer check valve, was satisfactorily leak tested during the most recent refueling outage. Because the inboard valve is leak tight, presently closed, and located in piping which is seismically qualified, the inadequate seismic support of the outboard piping and check valve has minimal safety significance.


Cause of Event:

A seismic analysis of the outboard CRD return piping in response to IE Bulletin 79-04 indicated that the piping supports were unsatisfactory. A seismic analysis for the outboard piping apparently was not performed for initial installation due to an interface problem between the Architect Engineer and a Nuclear Steam System Supplier sub-contractor.

Corrective Action:

Seismically qualified pipe support designs have been completed for both units. The required modifications have been completed on Unit 2. The modifications on Unit 3 will be completed by the end of a one week outage scheduled to begin on June 1, 1979.

Yours truly,



M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &
Program Analysis

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