

Georgia Power Company
Plant E. I. Hatch
Baxley, Georgia 31513

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

Addition of this excess positive reactivity caused the short period and the resultant reactor scram.

Operator license training presently thoroughly covers the effects of subcritical multiplication and more than adequately instructs operators in how subcritical multiplication is affected as criticality is approached. Operators are thoroughly schooled in how neutron monitoring system instrumentation should respond as criticality is approached such that if criticality is approached while in RWM/RSCS groups 1, 2, 3, or 4 a notch and wait withdrawal scheme is employed. In the event that an impending criticality is not recognized and in the event that such criticality yields a reactor period too fast to be manually controlled by the operator, then neutron monitoring instrumentation is provided to limit the extent of the power ascension and in fact cause a power reduction by scrambling the reactor. This is precisely what occurred on January 31.

It is our contention that no improvements in operator training nor administrative controls would absolutely preclude recurrence of similar events in the future. Revisions to the normal startup and scram recovery procedures of both Units have been approved to incorporate a requirement to employ a notch and wait control rod withdrawal scheme when it becomes apparent from the affects of subcritical multiplication that criticality is impending.

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