

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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CON'T
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On 7/24/78, a floor drain check valve was discovered to be out of the floor drain in
0 3 Mechanical Penetration Room No. 4. These floor drain check valves are to remain in
0 4 the floor drain after Mode 4 is entered. An Emergency Ventilation System analysis
0 5 shows that the system will produce and maintain the negative pressure as required with
0 6 an additional opening in the negative pressure boundary of 43.2 square inches. Shield
0 7 building integrity would have been maintained with the drain check valve removed.
0 8 (NP-33-78-99)

0 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The floor drain check valve was removed at some time during the outage to place a
1 1 drain hose in the drain and was never replaced after the work was completed. The floor
1 2 drain check valve was replaced on July 24, 1978. The drains have been identified
1 3 further with plastic tags stating "DO NOT REMOVE WITHOUT FIRST NOTIFYING THE SHIFT
1 4 FOREMAN".

1 5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-99

DATE OF EVENT: July 24, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

1 | IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Floor drain check valve removed from drain

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

1 | Description of Occurrence: During a routine operator visual inspection on July 24, 1978 at 1130 hours, a floor drain check valve was discovered to be out of the floor drain in Mechanical Penetration Room No. 4. These floor drain checks are to remain in the floor drain after Mode 4 is entered and are not to be removed without permission of the Shift Foreman. Also, the personnel involved in removal of the valve should not leave the area until the valve is replaced. This is required by Special Order No. 88 (June 30, 1977). This is being submitted in accordance with Section 6.9.1.9c of the Technical Specifications.

1 | Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The floor drain check valve was removed at some time during the outage to place a drain hose in the drain and was never replaced after the work was completed.

1 | Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The floor drain check valve being out of the floor drain is a violation of administrative controls.

1 | The results of an Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) negative pressure analysis determined that the EVS will produce and maintain the negative pressure as required with an additional unsealed opening in the negative pressure boundary of 43.2 square inches. Shield building integrity would have thus been maintained with the valve removed.

1 | Corrective Action: The floor drain check valve was replaced on July 24, 1978. The drains were tagged with plastic tags stating "DO NOT REMOVE WITHOUT FIRST NOTIFYING THE SHIFT FOREMAN".

1 | Failure Data: Shield building integrity has previously been violated (Licensee Event Reports NP-33-77-33, NP-33-77-34 and NP-33-77-47) but those occurrences were not due to floor drain check valves being out of place, but were caused by shield building doors being open.