

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	E	F	C	S	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5					
7	8	LICENSER CODE						14	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE					30	CAT				56

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 0 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5 7 0 2 2 6 7 0 9 0 3 1 0 7 0 9

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During power ascension, it was noticed that, at 15% power, "O" channel loss of
0 3 load trip did not annunciate. Tech. Spec. Table 2-2 requires this signal at
0 4 15% power. The other three channels were operating correctly at the time;
0 5 thereby giving proper redundancy. Malfunctioning channel was bypassed upon
0 6 discovery and until repairs were completed.
0 7
0 8

SYSTEM CODE I A 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE G 13		COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14		COMP. SUBCODE X 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
EVENT YEAR 7 9 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 5 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30		REVISION NO. 0 32			
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 37 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 42		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 43		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 4 9 0 26 44 47							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 As a result of troubleshooting, it was found that the bistable multivibrator

1 1 was set to 18.1%. The bistable was reset to 15% and the appropriate surveillance

1 2 test, ST-RPS-9, performed to ensure proper operation.

1 3

1 4

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	0	1	5	N/A	3	31	Operator Observation	

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 4 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35

N/A

LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	000	(37) Z	(38) N/A					

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
1	3	0	0
40			N/A

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PUBLICITY (45) 7903270516 NRC USE ONLY
ISSUED (44) M/A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

NAME OF PREPARER M. Core/G. R. Peterson

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LER 79-005
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 05000285

Attachment No. 1

Safety Analysis

The effects of the drift of the bi-stable, which automatically activates the Loss-of-Load and ADP trips and automatically de-activates the High Rate of Power Change above 15% of rated power and reverses this process below 15% of rated power, is minimal. The Loss-of-Load and High Rate of Power Changes trips are not LSSS's and as such no credit is taken for them in the safety analysis. Therefore, the only safety significance that must be addressed as a result of this drift in the bi-stable is the fact that the APD trip on one channel was not activated until the power level had reached approximately 18% power.

At this time, the ASI was being maintained within Figure 2-7 of the Techn. Specs. in accordance with Tech. Spec. 2.10.4(5). This limited the ASI to $\pm .4$ ASI units. Therefore, the ASI was being maintained within the APD trip limits and the initiating conditions for any AOC were within the bounds of the safety analysis. This is because any AOC transient is terminated at 10% above the initial power level by the Variable Overpower Trip, and the APD trip would have been properly activated prior to achieving this maximum power level assumed in the transient analysis. Therefore, the APD trip would have been able to properly fulfill its design function when credit is taken for the fact that the ASI was within the limits of Figure 2-7.

Re Andrews

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Attachment No. 2

Corrective Action

During investigation of the stated problem, it was found that the High Rate Trip - Wide Range Log channels are set contrary to Tech. Spec. Table 2.2. Table 2.2. gives permissible bypass conditions as follows:

1. Axial Power Distribution: Below 15% of rated power.
2. Loss of Load: Below 15% of rated power.
3. High Rate Trip - Wide Range Log Channels: Below 10^{-4} % and above 15% of rated power.

With items 1 and 2 set at 15%, item 3 cannot be set to comply precisely with the Technical Specification. OPPD will submit a license change to resolve this conflict.

ReAndrews