NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | O H D B S 1 (2) | Ø Ø - Ø Ø N P F - Ø 3 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6 (7) | Ø 1 Ø 4 7 9 (8) | Ø 1 3 1 7 9 (9)

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | At 0800 hours on 1/4/79, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) Damper HV5311E

0 3 | was declared inoperable. Surveillance testing had determined a deficiency existed.

0 4 | The damper was then blocked open to maintain Control Room ventilation. This occur-

0 5 | rence is being reported as documentation of a component failure. There was no danger

0 6 | to the health and safety of the public or unit personnel. The failure of this damper

0 7 | did not render either train of the Control Room EVS inoperable. The subject damper

0 8 | is redundant in the Control Room EVS train. (NP-33-79-04)

7 8 9 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE S G (11) | CAUSE CODE E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE X (13) | COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P (14) | COMP. SUBCODE J (15) | VALVE SUBCODE D (16)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR 7 9 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. Ø Ø 3 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE Ø 3 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. Ø

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN C (18) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) Ø Ø Ø Ø | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 6 2 6 (26)

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The pneumatic operator was found to be leaking and a new operator was installed. The

1 1 | damper was operated and tested for response time. The damper was declared operable

1 2 | at approximately 1200 hours on 1/12/79. All other Control Room EVS operators

1 3 | similar to the one that failed have been inspected.

1 4 |

7 8 9 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS E (28) | % POWER Ø 9 9 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Surveillance Test ST 5032.01

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER Ø Ø Ø (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER Ø Ø Ø (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

7 8 9 11 12 80

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1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION NA

7 8 9 10 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

DVR 79-004 NAME OF PREPARER James Rudolph PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 234

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-04

DATE OF EVENT: January 4, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) Damper HV5311E rendered inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2750, and Load (Gross MWE) = 920.

Description of Occurrence: At 0800 hours on January 4, 1979, Control Room EVS Damper HV5311E was declared inoperable. The mechanical control linkage for HV5311E, the suction damper for normal Control Room Ventilation Fans, was disconnected, and the damper blocked open to maintain Control Room ventilation pending cylinder repair or replacement of the complete mechanism. The failure was detected by a power plant repairman who was investigating the cause of suspended Surveillance Test ST 5032.01, "Monthly Functional Test of the Radiation Monitoring System".

This occurrence is being reported as documentation of a component failure.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The pneumatic operator for HV5311E was found to be leaking, therefore rendering insufficient service to the subject damper.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The failure of this damper did not render either train of the Control Room EVS inoperable. The subject damper is redundant in the Control Room EVS train.

Corrective Action: A new operator was installed per Maintenance Work Order 79-1193. The damper was operated and tested for response time per ST 5076.03, "Control Room EVS Refueling Test". The damper was declared operable at approximately 1200 hours on January 12, 1979. All other Control Room EVS operators similar to the one that failed have been inspected for cylinder leakage and none were reported to be leaking.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences of an EVS damper removed from service due to pneumatic operator trouble.

LER #79-003