



February 5, 1979

L79-135

FILE: RR 2 (NP-33-79-08)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reportable Occurrence 79-008
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: January 9, 1979

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 79-008 with a supplemental information sheet which is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray / TDM

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/SNB/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies LER 79-008

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
Encl: 3 copies LER 79-008

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-08

DATE OF EVENT: January 9, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Recirculation System Fan 1-1 failed to run

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2732, and Load (Gross MWE) = 910

Description of Occurrence: On January 9, 1979 during the performance of Surveillance Test ST 5065.06, "Containment Recirculation System Monthly Test", Containment Recirculation Fan 1-1 failed to run after the startup button was released. It was also noted that both the local and remote indicating lights were lost. Attempts to reset the breaker and start the fan failed.

This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 which requires the one inoperable Containment Recirculation System to be restored to an operable status within 30 days or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Although the exact cause is unknown, the failure has been attributed to the buildup of a non-conductive film on the surfaces of the auxiliary controller contacts. Insufficient contact prevented the auxiliary coil from operating.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The standby Containment Recirculation Fan 1-2 was operable and would have provided air circulation for hydrogen dilution in the event of a loss of coolant accident.

Corrective Action: The controller and breaker for Recirculation Fan 1-1 was inspected for loose connections and contacts. The contacts were inspected and cleaned under Maintenance Work Order 79-1233. Containment Recirculation Fan 1-1 was operationally tested and declared operable. The unit was removed from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 at 1100 hours on January 10, 1979.

Failure Data: There have been no previous reported occurrences of Containment Recirculation Fans failing to run.