

CONTROL BLOCK:

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7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58	

7 8

REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

0 2 While performing the RCIC Monthly Valve Operability Test, procedure
0 3 QOS 1300-3, the MO 2-1301-16 steam inlet valve failed to close
0 4 (T.S. 3.7.D.1). The valve was demonstrated to open satisfactorily.
0 5 The inline outboard steam valve, MO 2-1301-17, was fully operable and
0 6 had full isolation capability. RCIC was not rendered inoperable as a
0 7 result of this event. As a precautionary action, the HPCI System was
0 8 demonstrated to be operable.
7 8 9 89

SYSTEM CODE C E 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE A 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14		COMP. SUBCODE E 15		VALVE SUBCODE D 16	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 8		EVENT YEAR 7 9		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 4		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE 1		REVISION NO. 0	
ACTION TAKEN A 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT B 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 6		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 6 6 5 26		CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27					

10 Component failure of the torque switch on valve M0 2-1301-16. When the
11 switch was inspected, it was found that the shaft of the switch was
12 binding and thereby opening the contacts prematurely. The torque switch
13 was removed and a replacement was installed. The valve was then cycled
14 successfully to demonstrate operability.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E 6 8 29 NA OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B Routine Test DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) 1 6 Z 34 Z 35 NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION
1	2	NA

7 8 9 10 11 12

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION

1 9 Z (42) NA

79081406/P

7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

2 0 N (44) NA

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

PHONE: 309-654-2241 Ext 176

- I. LER NUMBER: RO 79-14/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On July 23, 1979, while performing the RCIC Monthly Valve Operability Test, Procedure QOS 1300-3, the MO 2-1301-16 steam inlet valve failed to close. Subsequent attempts to operate and close the valve were however, successful. The valve could be opened at all times during this event. The outboard steam inlet valve, MO 2-1301-17, was fully operable and had full isolation capability. As a precautionary action, the HPCI System was demonstrated to be operable.

At 4:00 p.m. on July 24, 1979, drywell deinerting was started, and a Unit Two load reduction was begun. At 12:45 a.m. on July 25, 1979, at an electrical load of approximately 350 MWe, a drywell entry was made and the torque switch on valve MO 2-1301-16 was replaced.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The RCIC system is provided to supply make-up water to the reactor core when the reactor is isolated from the main heat sink and when the feedwater system is not available. The HPCI system provides an alternate method of supplying make-up water to the reactor should normal feedwater be unavailable. RCIC was in fact operable since MO-2-1301-16 could auto-open if needed. The HPCI System was demonstrated to be operable, and the steam supply line would have isolated via closure of MO-2-1301-17, if necessary. Hence, the safe operation of the reactor was unaffected by this event.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of this event is attributed to component failure of the torque switch on valve MO 2-1301-16. When the switch was inspected, it was found that the switch shaft was binding, and thereby opening the contacts prematurely.

The valve operator is manufactured by Limitorque Corporation and is model SMB-000.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to achieve closure of the MO 2-1301-16 valve, which isolated the RCIC steam line. The HPCI system was demonstrated operable. Under work request number 3722-79, the torque switch was removed and a like-for-like replacement accomplished. Subsequent valve exercise was performed successfully.