NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Entry
01	Licensee Code (2)	NEFCS1
01	License Number (3)	00000000000
01	License Type (4)	41111
01	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	Report Source (6)	L
01	Docket Number (7)	05000285
01	Event Date (8)	122078
01	Report Date (9)	010279

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During plant heatup an operator noted that one pressure channel for the PORV system
03 was not responding. Technician troubleshooting the problem pulled recorder fuses
04 which caused both PORVs to open. The operator closed both PORV isolation valves to
05 terminate the transient. Both PORVs were returned to service 15 minutes later.
06
07
08

09	System Code (11)	Cause Code (12)	Cause Subcode (13)	Component Code (14)	Comp. Subcode (15)	Valve Subcode (16)
	CJ	D	Z	VALVEX	X	B

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
78	—	045	/	01	T	—	0

Action Taken (18)	Future Action (19)	Effect on Plant (20)	Shutdown Method (21)	Hours (22)	Attachment Submitted (23)	NPRD-4 Form Sub. (24)	Prime Comp Supplier (25)	Component Manufacturer (26)
E	F	Z	Z	0000	Y	N	N	D243

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Additional administrative controls were in effect during the short time the PORVs were
11 isolated to ensure that an overpressure condition would not occur. Additionally, if
12 at least one PORV could not have been returned to service the reactor coolant system
13 would have been depressurized and vented as required by Technical Specification
14 2.1.6(4). Modifications are being considered to prevent recurrence.

Line	Facility Status (28)	% Power (29)	Other Status (30)	Method of Discovery (31)	Discovery Description (32)
15	C	000	NA	A	Operator Observation

Line	Activity Released (33)	Content of Release (34)	Amount of Activity (35)	Location of Release (36)
16	Z	Z	NA	NA

Line	Personnel Exposures Number (37)	Type (38)	Description (39)
17	000	Z	NA

Line	Personnel Injuries Number (40)	Description (41)
18	000	NA

Line	Loss of or Damage to Facility (43) Type (42)	Description
19	Z	NA

Line	Publicity Issued (44)	Description (45)
20	N	NA

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Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 05000285

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

The power operated relief valves (PORV) provide low temperature overpressurization protection for the reactor coolant system.

At the time when the PORVs were isolated at Fort Calhoun Station the high pressure safety injection pump and the reactor coolant pumps were caution tagged in the pull-stop position. The Shift Supervisor stationed an operator full time at the pressure controls of the reactor coolant system during the period of time when both PORVs were isolated.

By taking these additional precautions the probability of an overpressurization event during the time the PORVs were isolated is significantly reduced.

The action of the operator to isolate the PORVs to terminate the depressurization transient and the additional administrative controls implemented are considered to be appropriate and proper.

If at least one PORV had not been promptly returned to an operable status, the reactor coolant system would have been depressurized and vented as required by Technical Specification 2.1.6(4). Since for a period of 15 minutes both PORVs were isolated with the reactor coolant system at low temperature (140°F) the least conservative aspect of Technical Specification 2.1.6(4) was exceeded and the event considered reportable.



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ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to restore both PORVs to an operable status and complete repairs/calibration of the effected channel as necessary.

Since (1) either one of two redundant low temperature/high pressure channels will actuate both power operated relief valves, and since (2) loss of power to indicating recorders when the reactor coolant temperature is less than 300°F in either channel will also cause a spurious and unnecessary actuation of both PORVs, the following permanent corrective action is being considered:

(1) Both PORV low temperature/high pressure channels may be modified to ensure that recorder power loss will not result in spurious actuation of the PORVs.

(2) A more practical means of disabling one channel for maintenance while ensuring that the redundant channel is operable will be investigated.

R. Andrews

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ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

This is the first incident involving inoperability of low temperature over-pressurization protection system.

W. Andrews