

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V | T | V | Y | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 57 CAT 58 | 5

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 9

7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0	2	
0	3	See attached sheet
0	4	
0	5	
0	6	
0	7	
0	8	

7 8 9 80

SYSTEM CODE S F 11		CAUSE CODE X 12		CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13		COMPONENT CODE T U R B I N 14		COMP. SUBCODE Z 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
EVENT YEAR 8 0 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 2 23 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 27 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30 31		REVISION NO. 0 32		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER T 1 4 7 26	
ACTION TAKEN Z 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	
NPRD-4 FORM 308 N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25		CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27		28		29		30	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1	0	
1	1	See attached sheet
1	2	
1	3	
1	4	

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	E	28	1	0	0	29	NA	30
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION			
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION					
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41	1866	130
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	42	NA	43	8002040	449	80	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION					
2	0	N	44	NA	45	80			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16

NAME OF PREPARER W. F. Conway

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During monthly operability surveillance testing of the HPCI System, the turbine tripped when initially started. Coincident with the turbine trip, the HPCI steam valves isolated and the high turbine exhaust pressure annunciator was observed. The HPCI isolation valves were reopened and the turbine started successfully. This immediate demonstration of HPCI operability precluded taking the action specified in Tech. Spec. Section 3.5.E.2. Based on the above, the potential consequences to the health and safety of the public were minimal. There have been no previous similar occurrences reported to the Commission.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of the HPCI steam valve isolation was diagnosed as a spurious high steam flow, although the high steam line D/P annunciator was not observed to operate. The isolation signal is provided with a seal-in circuit so that a signal of very short duration can cause isolation without activating the annunciator. It is not known whether the turbine trip was caused by high exhaust pressure or the automatic isolation signal. The high exhaust pressure switches, steam line D/P switches and turbine controller were checked and all components were found to be operable. In addition, surveillance testing of the annunciator for high steam line D/P was performed on January 14, 1980, which showed this annunciator to be operational. Although the root cause of this event could not be determined, it is concluded that the trip was the result of a spurious signal of unknown origin. This system is tested monthly and all parameters will be carefully monitored during the next surveillance test.