



October 27, 1978

L78-755
FILE: RR 2 (NP-33-78-118)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reportable Occurrence 78-100
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: October 1, 1978

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 78-100, with a supplemental information sheet, which is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/JRL/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies LER 78-100

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
Encl: 3 copies LER 78-100

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-118

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 1, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Unidentified Leakage
Exceeded the Allowable Limit (1 GPM)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0, and
Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0625 hours on October 1, 1978, during routine performance of Surveillance Test ST 5042.02, "RCS Water Inventory Balance", the calculated value for unidentified leakage exceeded the 1 GPM limit by 0.08 GPM. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.

At 0730 hours on October 1, 1978, measurement of the Reactor Coolant Pumps standpipe leak-off was found to have increased by .54 GPM. This identified seal leakage reduced the unidentified leakage to 0.54 GPM, and removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is attributed to changes in the amount of seal leak-off.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no threat to the health and safety of the public or unit personnel. The final data showed all leakage specifications to be within allowable limits. Additionally, the revised measurement of Reactor Coolant Pump standpipe leakage accounted for essentially all of the observed increase in total leakage. The small leakages were processed through the normal containment sump.

Corrective Action: Prompt action was initiated to investigate and correct the cause of the increase in RCS leakage. Measurement of the seal leak-off by recording the time to fill a 400 ml cylinder showed an overall increase of This increase accounted for essentially all of the observed increase. Investigation into the possibility of installing more accurate seal leakage indication is continuing per Facility Change Request 78-357.

Failure Data: On March 14, 1978, Reactor Coolant System leakage exceeded 1 GPM as a result of an increase in Reactor Coolant Pump seal leak-off (Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-3').