

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation, one-inch isolation valve on the torus sample

0 3 line was found in the open position. The valve, located on the suction

0 4 side of "C" containment spray pump, was open for a period of seven days.

0 5 Approximately 10,000 gallons of torus water was drained to the 1-7

0 6 floor drain sump and pumped directly into the radwaste facility. During

0 7 this time, the ability of primary containment to function as intended

0 8 was degraded.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

0 10 S A 11 A 12 C 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16

0 17 LER RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

0 18 7 9 19 0 2 5 20 0 3 21 L 22 0

0 19 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

0 20 F 12 G 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 Y 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 9 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The valve was left open after the completion of torus water sampling.

1 1 The valve was closed and locked in the closed position. Additionally, a

1 2 threaded cap has been installed on the pipe utilized to take the sample.

1 3 Also, a change to the sampling procedure has been submitted which

1 4 addresses the use of the subject valve.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 6 E (28) 0 9 9 (29) NA A (31) NA

1 7 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 8 Z (33) Z (34) NA

1 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

1 10 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA

1 11 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

1 12 0 0 0 (40) NA

1 13 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

1 14 Z (42) NA


1 15 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

1 16 Y (44) Weekly news release.

1 17 7911190393

1 18 NRC USE ONLY

1 19 NAME OF PREPARER Donald A. Ross PHONE 201-455-8784



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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-25/1T-0

Report Date

November 13, 1979

Occurrence Dates

July 30, 1979
August 6, 1979

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3, when primary containment was not fully maintained for one week by the failure to close a torus sample line isolation valve after completion of torus water sampling. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power. The major parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Power: Generator, 640 MWe
Reactor, 1918.4 MWt
Flow: Recirculating, 15.2×10^4 gpm
Feedwater, 7.178×10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas: 2.79×10^4 μ ci/sec

Description of Occurrence

On August 6, 1979, at approximately 0900 hours, a one-inch isolation valve on the torus sample line was found in the "open" position. The valve located on the suction side of "C" containment spray pump was opened for a period of seven days. Approximately 10,000 gallons of torus water was drained to the 1-7 floor drain sump and pumped directly to the radwaste facility.

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Apparent Cause of Occurrence

It is suspected that a chemical technician failed to close the isolation valve after completion of sampling the torus water.

Analysis of Occurrence

The primary containment system is designed to limit off-site dose resulting from the rupture of any pipe with break areas from zero up to twice the cross sectional area of a recirculation line to well below 10 CFR 100 guideline limits. The reactor and all its systems are designed to operate safely to preclude failures which could release unacceptable amounts of fission products. As backup, the pressure absorption containment will contain any radioactive material which might escape from the reactor. The ability of primary containment to perform its intended function with the torus sample line valve in the "open" position was degraded.

Corrective Action

The valve was immediately closed and locked in the closed position. Additionally, a threaded cap has been installed on the pipe utilized to take the sample. A change to the torus sampling procedure has been submitted which specifically addresses the unlocking, opening, closing, and locking of the subject valve.

Failure Data

Not applicable.

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