

Update LER
Previous Report Date 10-17-79

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM CODE 0 9		CAUSE CODE C I C		CAUSE SUBCODE E		COMPONENT CODE V A L V I E S						COMP. SUBCODE X		VALVE SUBCODE B			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
LER/RU REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 7 9		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 4		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 2							
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32								
ACTION TAKEN B		FUTURE ACTION E		EFFECT ON PLANT C		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 7 0 2 0	
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS																	

7			8			9			FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			80					
1			5			B			28			0			9			6			29			NA			44		
7			8			9			10			12			13			45			46			Test Data			80		
ACTIVITY			CONTENT			RELEASED OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			35			LOCATION OF RELEASE			36											
1			6			Z			33			Z			34			NA			44			45			80		
7			8			9			10			11			45														
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			NUMBER			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			39																	
1			7			0			0			37			Z			38			NA			80					
7			8			9			11			12			13														
PERSONNEL INJURIES			NUMBER			DESCRIPTION			41																				
1			8			0			0			0			40			NA			60			POOR ORIGINAL					
7			8			9			11			12																	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			43																				
1			9			Z			42			NA			80														
7			8			9			10																				
PUBLICITY			ISSUED			DESCRIPTION			45																				
2			0			NA			44			7911090571			NRC USE ONLY														
7			8			9			10																				

PHONE: 912-367-7781

Georgia Power Company
Plant E. I. Hatch
Baxley, Georgia 31513

Event Description and Probable Consequences (continued)

but not for Unit 1, although this had not occurred previously on Unit 1 with the 2 stage topworks.

Later information was disclosed based on data received from the safety relief valves LVDT and accelerometer instrumentation that was read by the General Electric startrec computer. GE analyzed this data and based upon the data suggested that all safety relief valves failed to hold within 1 percent of setpoint while in operation even though seven of the valves did open.

Based on the GE report, Georgia Power then removed the topworks from the remaining 9 safety relief valves and had them sent to Wyle Labs. Wyle Lab bench tested all safety relief valve pilots, and it was noted that in addition to safety relief valves C and G being out of setpoint, safety relief valves F, H, M, K, and L were also out of their setpoints in the high direction on the first lift. All but SRV-G were within setpoint after the first lift.

It was also noted that SRVs A, B, D, F, and M pilots had excessive leakage prior to the bench test. As Found data is shown below:

SRV	S/N	Setpoint	As-Found	Experienced Leakage*	Within Setpoint After First Lift
A	301	1100	1108	YES	YES
B	312	1090	1088	YES	YES
C	308	1090	1162	NO	YES
D	304	1100	1110	YES	YES
E	303	1110	1118	NO	YES
F	305	1090	1079	YES	YES
G	310	1090	1134	NO	NO
H	309	1110	1124	NO	YES
K	302	1100	1140	NO	YES
L	307	1110	1165	NO	YES
M	306	1100	1155	YES	YES

*Prior to test

To check for possible damage to the safety relief valve body disc and seat, two valves that proved to have the greatest chattering characteristics during the MSIV closure test were sent off for inspection and no damage was found.

1707 349

SRV Actuation Data

SRV	Setpoint	Poppett S/N	Benchd	Page±1%	Opened	Should Have Opened
A	1100	301	1094-1101	1083-1112	YES	YES
B	1090	312	1092-1095	1081-1106	YES	YES
C	1090	308	1080-1085	1069-1096	NO	YES
D	1100	304	1098-1104	1087-1115	YES	YES
E	1110	303	1107-1118	1096-1109	YES	YES
F	1090	305	1089-1099	1078-1110	YES	YES
G	1090	310	1088-1092	1077-1103	NO	YES
H	1110	309	1108-1115	1097-1125	YES	YES
K	1100	302	1093-1106	1082-1117	YES	YES
L	1110	307	1113-1115	1102-1126	NO	NO
M	1100	306	1103-1110	1093-1121	NO	NO

Data prior to bench testing.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

sensitivity to back pressure and thus reduce chattering during blowdowns and increase blowdown time. These modifications would also resolve the problem of the first valve lift setpoint being excessively high due to the disc adhering to the seat which appeared to be the problem that caused the valves to be out of setpoint.

Since there is no realistic instrumentation to monitor the reactor pressure at the safety relief valves during a blowdown, temporary pressure transducers were installed on the main steam lines at the SRV locations to allow more accurate monitoring of pressure at the inlets to the SRVs. Another MSIV closure test was run to test the operation of the SRVs. It was found from data taken during this second MSIV closure of June, 1979, that the valves did not stick and result in too high SRV lift setpoints.

The valves were all within setpoint. Based on this data the special SRV pressure and relief valve displacement instrumentation was removed except on SRV-G which still has an unexplained sensitivity to back pressure resulting in chattering. This chattering was deemed to not be of any consequence to valve operation, but the tailpipe discharge lines will be further inspected during the next major maintenance outage. The questions dealing with SRV setpoint reliability resulting from the LER should be closed.

1707 350