

LER 79-26/3L

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

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7	8

REPORT SOURCE

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SOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE																																																																												

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

09		SYSTEM CODE		Z Z		CAUSE CODE		E		CAUSE SUBCODE		B		COMPONENT CODE				S U P P O R T		COMP. SUBCODE		D		VALVE SUBCODE		Z															
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	
LER RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		7 9		SHUTDOWN METHOD		Z		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		0 2 6		OCCURRENCE CODE		0 3		REPORT TYPE		L		REVISION NO.		0		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
D		Z		Z		Z		Z		0 2 6		0 3		L		0		L		L		0		D		Z		Z		0 0 0 0		Y		Y		A		G 2 5 7			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

FACILITY STATUS (28) H

% POWER 0 0 0 (29)

OTHER STATUS (30) NA

METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) T. S. required surveillance

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(17)	Z	(38)		(39) NA
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
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PUBLICITY		DESCRIPTION (45)		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	NA	7911650336		
7	8	9	10	68	69

PHONE: 257-7711

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

Visual inspection of Vermont Yankee's safety class shock suppressors was performed as required by Technical Specifications 4.6.I. 4 during the 1979 refuel outage. Snubber RR-13 on the A loop recirculation pump was found with no visible fluid level in its sight glass. The snubber was removed and functionally tested in the as-found condition. The snubber did not lockup in tension within the required tolerances and was declared a visual inspection failure. The snubber was repaired and returned to service prior to reactor startup as required by Tech. Spec. section 3.6.I.4. Based on the above, and the lack of any seismic event which would require the snubber to be functional, there were no adverse consequences of this occurrence to the health and safety of the public. Similar previous occurrences were reported to the Commission in RO 76-26/3L and RO 79-9/3L.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Functional testing on the VY test machine revealed leakage at the Lenz fitting on the snubber rod end tube connection. No obvious seal degradation was observed; however, the fitting O-rings were somewhat brittle. Snubber RR-13 was completely rebuilt and was functionally tested prior to reinstallation. As a result of the failure of snubber RR-13 to pass the visual examination, the next required inspection interval is 12 months \pm 25%. RR-13 is a 4" Grinnel Figure 201 shock suppressor.

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