

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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POOR ORIGINAL

October 22 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on October 5, 1979.

Reference:	Docket Number 50-273
Report No:	LER 3-79-32/IT
Report Date:	October 22, 1979
Occurrence Date:	October 5, 1979
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 6.9.a(9) requires reporting "performance of structures, systems, or components that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analysis in the safety analysis report..."

Technical Specification 3.5.F.3 states "When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor is in the Cold shutdown Condition, both core spray systems, the LPCI and containment cooling subsystems may be inoperable, provided no work is being done which has the potential for draining the reactor vessel."

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Description of the Event:

The continuing inspection program being performed in response to IE Bulletin 79-02 has identified a support, 3-33-HB-S103, on the Emergency Service Water system that had two of four anchor bolts which failed to achieve proper torque requirements. Because two of four bolts failed, the safety factor of the seismic support was less than two.

Consequences of Event:

The safety significance of the failure of this anchor is small, because the Unit 3 reactor is in the cold shutdown condition for refueling. The system associated with support A & C loops of the core spray, need not be operable under these conditions per Technical Specification 3.5.F.3. Further, failure of the piping at this support location would not prevent delivery of emergency service water.

Cause of Event:

The most probable cause of failure for these two anchor bolts was improper installation.

Corrective Action:

All four shell type anchor bolts were replaced with wedge type bolts. Plate washers were installed over all four bolts to comply with the bolt hole gap criterion. Corrective action has been completed and the safety factor is greater than five.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

2-79-33/1T, 2-79-35/1T, 3-79-19/1T, 3-79-23/1T, 3-79-25/1T, 3-79-26/1T, 2-79-43/1T, 2-79-44/1T, 3-79-30/1T, 3-79-31/1T.

Yours truly,



M. J. Cooney  
Superintendent  
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &  
Program Analysis

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