

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-093/03X-1

Page 1 of 1

During normal operation, Operations personnel noted that a routine computer print out of the core performance log indicated that the Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density (CMFLPD) was 1.003 compared to a Technical Specification limit of equal to or less than 1.000. Reactor power was immediately reduced approximately 2% in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications, Appendix A, Paragraph 3.5.I. This action restored CMFLPD to within the limits of Technical Specifications within the time frame allowed and is considered to be equivalent to operation in a degraded mode.

Following the initial power reduction, the core performance log was again demanded from the plant's process computer and revealed that CMFLPD was within specifications. Control rod pattern adjustments were made and approximately two hours later, power was restored to between 99 and 100% of rated power. A core performance log demanded following the power increase revealed that CMFLPD was with specifications.

The event did not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

NOTE: LER 79-083 is a related event and Revision 1 of this LER is submitted to correct the Technical Specification Paragraph reference above.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 N Y J A F I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

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0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 7 1 0 2 1 7 9 8 1 1 2 9 7 9 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

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SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
R C 11 A 12 A 13 X X X X X X X 14 Z 15 Z 16
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
7 9 1 0 9 3 0 3 X 1
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 Z 19 B 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 9 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

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NAME OF PREPARER W. Verne Childs

PHONE: (315) 342-3840

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NRC USE ONLY



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY

231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

November 16, 1979

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1

Gentlemen:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENTS
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT

Your letter dated October 1, 1979 requested that we provide you with information concerning the loss of offsite power which occurred at Point Beach on October 13, 1973 and any other loss of offsite power events. There have been a total of four loss of offsite power events at Point Beach. The following details are provided in response to your request for information:

A. PARTIAL LOSSES OF OFFSITE POWER

1. Date: April 13, 1971
Event: Loss of normal offsite supply to bus 1A05.
Cause: Wiring error on relay test switch prevented blocking of undervoltage trip while relay was being tested.
Results: Diesel generator 3D started and picked up bus 1A05. No other offsite power supplies were affected. There were no voltage or frequency problems. Normal power supply was restored a short time later. There was no effect on the unit since it was shut down at the time.

B. TOTAL LOSSES OF OFFSITE POWER

1. Date: February 5, 1971
Event: Loss of all offsite power and all transmission lines.
Cause: Major ice storm and improper relay operation.
Results: All transmission lines were lost and differential lockout relays on transformers 1X03, 1X04 and 2X04 tripped. Both diesel generators started and picked up the safeguards loads on Unit 1 which was not on

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AO's/p

November 16, 1979

B. TOTAL LOSSES OF OFFSITE POWER - continued

1. Results: line at the time. One bus on Unit 2 was not picked up because a control power fuse had blown. Unit 2 was not licensed yet and no fuel had been loaded. The restoration of offsite power to the plant was delayed by the need to evaluate gas samples from the transformers which had locked out. The outage lasted for 6 hours and 22 minutes. There were no voltage or frequency problems.
2. Date: October 13, 1973
Event: Loss of all offsite power to safeguards buses.
Cause: A lightning mast failed and fell on transformer 2X03 while transformer 1X03 and the gas turbine generator were temporarily out of service.
Results: The diesel generators started and supplied power to the safeguards buses of both units. Unit 1 was in hot shutdown and Unit 2 did not trip. The gas turbine generator was returned to service 55 minutes after the event and supplied offsite power to both units for 4 hours and 30 minutes. At that time transformer 1X03 was returned to service. There were no voltage or frequency problems.
3. Date: April 27, 1974
Event: Loss of all offsite power to Unit 1.
Cause: A wire lifted in the switchyard control house during a relay modification initiated a breaker failure scheme which isolated 345kV bus section 1.
Results: The isolation of B.S. 1 removed the power supply to transformer 1X03, the Unit 1 high voltage station auxiliary. A fast transfer took place on the 13.8kV bus which would have restored the offsite power to Unit 1, but the 4kV bus undervoltage relays operated before the transfer. These undervoltage relays trip the connections to offsite power and start the diesel generators. The buses which were now being supplied by the diesel generators were synchronized to the offsite power supply almost immediately by the operator and the system was returned to normal. There were no unit trips, nor were there any voltage or frequency problems.

Very truly yours,

C. W. Fay, Director
Nuclear Power Department

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