

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	Y	J	A	F	I	(2)	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	(3)	4	1	1	1	1	1	(4)				(5)
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE (1)

02 Please See Attachment

03

04 \_\_\_\_\_

05 \_\_\_\_\_

06 \_\_\_\_\_

07 \_\_\_\_\_

08 \_\_\_\_\_

7 8

SYSTEM CODE 9 10

CAUSE CODE 11

CAUSE SUBCODE 12

COMPONENT CODE 13 14 15 16 17 18

COMP. SUBCODE 19

VALVE SUBCODE 20

(17)	LER RO REPORT NUMBER	[EVENT YEAR 79] 21 22	[ ] 23	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [057] 24 26	[ ] 27	OCCURRENCE CODE [01] 28 29	REPORT TYPE [T] 30	[ ] 31	REVISION NC. [0] 32
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
[F] 33	[18][Z] 34 (19)	[Z] 35 (20)	[Z] 36 (21)	[0000] 37 40	[Y] 41 (23)	[N] 42 (24)	[A] 43 (25)	[S420] 44 47	(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION: (27)

1 0 Please See Attachment

1 1 \_\_\_\_\_

1 2 \_\_\_\_\_

1 3

1	4	
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80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS (30)		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)			
1	5	E	28	0	1	8	29	N/A	D	31	A/E	32
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1	6	Z	33	Z	34
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7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) N/A

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) N7A				

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12
		0	0	0	N/A

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)	
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION		
1	9	Z	N/A	(42)	1151 263

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION 7910150445 NRC USE ONLY

PHONE:

315-342-3840

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-057/01T-0

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During normal operation, as the result of the Pipe Stress Reanalysis being conducted by the Architect Engineer, the plant staff was notified that five pipe supports were considered inoperable; two were associated with Service Water return to the lake (H46-280 and H46-281) one was associated with Core Spray (H14-46) and two were associated with the RHR System (H10-503 and PFSK-503). As set forth in the August 14, 1979 letter lifting the Show Cause Order of March 13, 1979, analysis was performed to determine the effect of these overstressed supports upon system operability. From this analysis it was determined that two supports, H14-46 on the "B" Core Spray System and H46-281 on the Service Water System caused piping overstress.

The modifications to H14-46 were completed within the seven (7) day time frame required by the Technical Specifications and the August 14, 1979 letter. Surveillance testing of safety systems required by the Technical Specifications was satisfactorily accomplished during the period in which "B" Core Spray System was considered inoperable. The support is now fully acceptable.

The Service Water System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications. Modifications to H46-281 were accomplished within the seven (7) day time frame required by the August 14, 1979 letter. The support is now fully acceptable.

As set forth in Paragraph IV.4 of the August 14, 1979 letter, analysis was performed which proved the RHR System remained operable with H10-503 and PFSK-956 removed. Modifications to H10-503 have been completed. This support is now considered fully acceptable. Modification to PFSK-956 are in progress. The affected portion of the RHR system, the supply piping to the Fuel Pool Cooling System is isolated from the remainder of the system during power operations.

Analysis by the Architect Engineer showed that with H46-280 removed from the Service Water System no piping overstress would occur which would result in system inoperability. Modifications to this support are currently being designed. These will be pursued in an expeditious manner.

As noted above, all modification and analysis were performed within the time frames set forth in the August 14, 1979 letter and the Technical Specifications. All supports causing system inoperability have been upgraded such that the systems are fully operable. Modifications to those supports which, although inoperable, do not result in system inoperability, are being pursued in an expeditious manner. Therefore, the event did result in a significant safety hazard to the public health and safety.

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