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August 7, 1979

Docket Nos.: 50-277  
50-278

IE Bulletin 79-02  
Supplement

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

This is in response to your immediate action letter of August 3, 1979 and the telephone conversation between D. Marano, PECO and your Messrs. E. Jordan and H. Wong, NRC, also on August 3, 1979 regarding the base plate and anchor bolt analysis and testing results obtained from the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, pursuant to IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Revision 1. The actions requested and our responses are listed sequentially below:

## Item 1

Provide a statement of the calculated factors of safety for the eight affected supports in the Diesel Generator system and a statement of system operability.

## Response

In the Diesel Generator Building the calculated safety factors for the eight affected supports are as follows:

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<u>Hanger Support Designation</u>	<u>Safety Factor</u>
33 HB - F 5A	>5
33 HB - F 5B	>5
33 HB - F 5C	>5
33 HB - F 5D	>5
33 HB - S 16	3.5
33 HB - S 19	3.5
33 HB - S 20	2.7
33 HB - S 21*	2.75

\*Rework of support hanger 33 HB S 21 was completed as of August 5, 1979.

Since the Safety Factors of the above hangers are greater than 2.0, the affected systems are considered operable.

#### Item 2

For the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System, the affected support will be repaired within three days of the meeting date and to prevent possible flooding of equipment in the interim the valve in the vicinity of the support will be maintained locked closed and the pump room door kept open.

#### Response

The affected support, 33 HB S 158, has been reworked and the rework completed as of August 5, 1979. During the interim period, valve 33-521 located near the support was maintained locked closed and the reactor building cooling water heat exchanger room door was left open to preclude flooding due to a line break.

Since the calculated factor of safety for the support, as built is 4.88, which exceeds the safety factor of 4 recommended in IE Bulletin 79-02, our corrective action on this support is complete. The affected system is considered operable. At completion of the work, the room was closed off. Valve 33-521 is maintained closed.

#### Item 3

The affected support in the Emergency Cooling Tower will be repaired within the seven day time period allowed by the Technical Specifications that began at noon August 1, 1979.

#### Response

Support 48 GB S 21 was reworked to achieve a safety factor greater than 2.0 as of August 5, 1979 and with additional work

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completed August 6, 1979 now has a calculated Safety Factor of greater than 5.

With the calculated Safety Factor for the affected support in the reworked condition greater than 5, the affected system is considered operable.

Item 4

For the affected support in the Condensate Storage System perform an evaluation for the support factor of safety using the as-built conditions, inspect and test the anchor bolts in the support and provide a conclusion of system operability.

Response

Support 3 - 27-HCR - S28A has been re-analyzed in its as built condition with a resulting Safety Factor of 2.1. This support was inspected and its anchor bolts tested satisfactorily.

Since the Factor of Safety of the support in its as built configuration is greater than 2, the affected system is considered operable.

Item 5

Provide an expedited testing schedule for anchor bolts sufficient to support statements on system operability for each unit.

Response

The following testing schedule is being implemented to achieve completion of testing and work of the Unit 2 supports by November 1, 1979 and the Unit 3 supports by October 12, 1979:

Unit 2. 572 pipe support base plates remain to be inspected, tested and accepted. An inspection, testing and acceptance rate of approximately forty-five plates per week over the next thirteen weeks has been established.

Unit 3. 490 pipe support base plates remain to be inspected, tested and accepted. To coincide with the completion of the Unit 3 outage, completion of the inspection, testing and acceptance of the Unit 3 affected base plates is scheduled for October 12, 1979. Therefore, a testing and acceptance rate of approximately 50 base plates per week for the next ten weeks has been established.

Testing and acceptance of pipe support base plates will be monitored on a system basis as information is received to ensure that all Seismic Category I Systems are tested and accepted in a timely manner and to monitor potential trends.

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Item

Description of the disposition of other pipe supports with safety factors less than 2 which were identified in PECO response to IE Bulletin 79-02 and subsequent discussions with NRC representatives.

Response

The Safety Factors of the remaining supports identified in previous correspondence and discussions after rework and/or re-analysis are as follows:

<u>Support No</u>	<u>Safety Factor</u>
3-10GB-S44	>5.0
3-23DDN-S26	2.14
23DDN-S31	2.6
3-9HB-S1	2.24
10GB-S44	2.83
3-33HB-S126	>5.0
33HB-S148	>5.0
33HB-S157	>5.0
3-10GB-H86	2.66
48GB-S19	3.09
48HB-S18	3.09
3-23DDN-H17	4.34
23DDN-H17	4.83
3-23HB-H106	>5.0

Since the above listed Safety Factors are greater than 2, the affected systems are considered operable.

Pipe support 3-10GB-H58 is a spring hanger and as agreed need not be reworked at this time; however, this support will be upgraded during the next Unit 3 outage, scheduled to be completed by October 12, 1979.

Note that the first eight hanger supports listed above are the eight supports identified in our response to IE Bulletin 79-02, Item 2 as having factors of safety less than 1.0.

Also in our response to IE Bulletin 79-02, Item 2 we identified 13 supports with factors of safety less than 2 but greater than 1. Subsequently, it was determined that one of the supports identified was not Seismic Category I and therefore has been deleted from our listing. The twelve remaining supports include the last six supports listed above, the previously mentioned spring hanger (3-10 GB H 58) and the following supports identified in Items 1 through 4:


Item 1) 33-HB-F5A & 33 HB-S21  
 Item 2) 33-HB-S158  
 Item 3) 48-GB-S21

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Item 4) 3-27HCR-S28A

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,



cc: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Washington, DC 20555

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