

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

* CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 N Y J A F I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 7 0 9 2 5 7 9 8 1 0 1 9 7 9 9

7 8 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Please See Attachment

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7 8 9

0 9 SYSTEM CODE W E (11) CAUSE CODE E (12) CAUSE SUBCODE F (13) COMPONENT CODE X X X X X X X (14) COMP. SUBCODE Z (15) VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

(17) LER NO. REPORT NUMBER 1 7 9 (18) ACTION TAKEN X (19) FUTURE ACTION Z (20) EFFECT ON PLANT B (21) SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (22) HOURS 0 0 0 0 (23) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (24) NPD-4 FORM SUB. N (25) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A (26) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER W 1 2 0 (27) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

1 0 Please See Attachment

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

7 8 9

1 5 FACILITY STATUS E (28) % POWER 0 9 8 (29) OTHER STATUS NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY A (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation (32)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) NA NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

1 7 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

1 8 0 0 0 (40) NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

1 9 Z (42) NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 N (44) NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

NAME OF PREPARER W. Verne ChildsPHONE: 315-342-3840

7910230 458

NRC USE ONLY

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-076/03L-0

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During normal operation, after a protracted shutdown of approximately six (6) months, reactor water conductivity indicated an increase from its normal range of less than 1 micromho/cm. This resulted from the exhaustion of some condensate demineralizers and from condenser tube leaks (later discovered). After the conductivity increased toward four (4) micromho/cm, the plant power was reduced in preparation for shutdown since the Technical Specification limit is 5.0 micromho/cm as set forth in the Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 3.6.C.4. After this power reduction, six (6) tubes found leaking, were plugged in the condenser. During this operation, the reactor water conductivity increased to a maximum value of 6.0 but then decreased while the plugging operation was in progress. When the conductivity decreased below the Technical Specification limit and when it had been determined that the cause of the high conductivity had been found, further preparation for shutdown after the initial reduction in power to 50%, were discontinued and the reactor returned to the power escalation phase of operation.

The time period that reactor water conductivity was out of specification was short (approximately four (4) hours), corrective action was initiated as soon as practical, and the remaining chemistry specifications were well within limits therefore, the event did not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

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