

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	C	0	F	S	V	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	2	0	4			5			
7	8	LICENSEE CODE							14	LICENSE NUMBER											25	LICENSE TYPE					30			57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 7 0 8 2 3 7 9 8 0 9 1 7 7 9 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During testing, it was discovered that one of twelve helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switch units tripped outside the limits of LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3. Reportable per Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2. No effect on public health or safety. Redundant system available and operable. Similar reports RO 77-47 and RO 78-27.

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SYSTEM CODE C B 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE E 13		COMPONENT CODE I N S - T R U 14		COMP. SUBCODE S 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
EVENT YEAR 7 9 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 2 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30		REVISION NO. 0 32			
ACTION TAKEN X 18		FUTURE ACTION X 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 8 0 26							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | ITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point

1 1 | due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. Affected switches readjusted to

1 2 | proper trip points. Trip settings being checked on a monthly basis. Problem under

1 3 | investigation.

1 4 |

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8 9
FACILITY STATUS (28) % POWER (0 6 8) (29) OTHER STATUS (30)
1 5 E 0 6 8 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44
ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) (34) N/A (35)
1 6 Z 0 6 8 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
C Operability Test
45 46 80
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
N/A
45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	N/A	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
1	8	0	0
0	0	0	40
		N/A	

1022 210

7		8		9		10		11		12		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY						(43)						
TYPE		DESCRIPTION										
1	9	Z	(42)	N/A								

7 8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0 N (44) N/A 7909250 462 NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER

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NRC USE ONLY

REPORT DATE: September 17, 1979

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-32

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 23, 1979

ISSUE 0

Page 1 of 2

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/79-32/03-L-0

Preliminary

IDENTIFICATION OF
OCCURRENCE:

During performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that one of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT
DESCRIPTION:

While operating at 68% thermal power and 218 MW electrical power, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability test. The switches are normally calibrated on an annual basis; however, due to the problems cited in this report and Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/78-27, a check of buffer-mid-buffer trip settings on a monthly basis has been undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer) and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

Both the low and high electrical switches on PDIS-21149 for the 1A circulator tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

The low electrical switch tripped at a (-) 26 inches of water and the high electrical switch tripped at a (+) 84 inches of water. The other two switch units for 1A circulator and all switch units for 1B, 1C, and 1D circulators tripped within limits.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

1022 211

CAUSE

DESCRIPTION:

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

CORRECTIVE

ACTION:

The trip settings of the electrical switches were readjusted to the proper trip points.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings is being conducted on a monthly basis.

Three (3) of the pressure differential indicating switches were sent to ITT Barton in California for testing and evaluation to determine what can be done to correct this situation. The results will be reported in a future report.

The problem is under investigation.

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