

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

August 3, 1979

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USNRC
ATTN:

FILE: NG-3514(B)

SERIAL: GD-79-2006

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Region II
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62
DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324
SUPPLEMENT TO RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 79-08

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) originally responded to IE Bulletin 79-08 on April 23, 1979. After further review and in response to concerns raised in an NRC letter of July 20, 1979, from Mr. T. A. Ippolito of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, CP&L finds it appropriate to submit the attached supplemental information. The information, in some cases, provides updates of the information contained in the original response, clarification of our actions with regards to the items in the bulletin, or provides additional commitments.

I trust this information is suitable for your use.

Yours very truly,

E. E. Utley

E. E. Utley
Executive Vice President
Power Supply & Customer Services

JJS/jcb
Attachment

cc: Messrs. V. Stello (NRC)
T. A. Ippolito (NRC)

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EXTRADIAL COPY

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 79-08

August 2, 1979

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RESPONSE TO ITEM 1

- 1) Review of Item 1 of IEB 79-08 by all licensed operators, plant management and supervisors with operational responsibilities has been documented in the Brunswick plant records.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 2

- 1) A review of the primary containment isolation design has been completed. This review verified that a safety injection signal will automatically initiate containment isolation on all lines whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capabilities.
- 2) A review of the primary containment isolation design and procedures has been completed. This review verified that a safety injection signal will automatically initiate containment isolation on all valves whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capability. The applicable Emergency Instructions and Operating Procedures were reviewed to ensure that the operators are instructed to verify that all automatic actions do occur.
- 3) CAC-V16 and CAC-V17 open only when a negative pressure exists in the drywell.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 6

- 1) Procedural controls for assuring that safety-related valves are returned to their correct position following testing, maintenance, or other necessary manipulations are included in operating procedures, operations' work procedures, clearance procedures, and periodic test. In all cases, the procedure which requires moving the valve from its correct position also requires returning the valve to its correct position.

These procedures have been reviewed for adequacy in coverage of all safety-related valves.

Retesting following maintenance is required in each operations' work procedure. These procedures have been reviewed for adequacy in coverage of all safety-related valves and components.

- 2) Valve line-up checks were performed on all safety-related systems to verify that all valves were in their proper position.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 7

- 1) The present logic associated with the CAC system will allow various valves to open when the isolation signal is cleared if its control switch is in the open position (i.e., the valve was open when the isolation occurred). Other valves in the system use spring-return-to-normal type switches and will remain closed when the isolation clears.

All appropriate procedures are being revised to instruct the operator to place the nonspring-return-to-normal switches to "close" when any CAC isolation signal is received. These revisions will be completed by August 31, 1979. A plant modification is being written to eliminate the problem of these valves opening without operator action when the isolation signal clears. The plant modification will be completed by November 1, 1979 if no problem is experienced in component procurement.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 8

- 1) Whenever a Technical Specification required safety-related system is removed from service, a Limiting Condition for Operation Evaluation Checksheet is initiated on that system. When this checksheet is prepared, the shift foreman performs a review to assure that redundant safety-related systems are operative as required by Technical Specifications. This includes a visual check of the system status on the control board. In order to document this approach, the checksheet will be revised by September 30, 1979, to include a sign-off indicating that the visual check was performed on systems required operable by the Technical Specifications.
- 2) Shift turnover is accomplished per Administrative Procedure 4.1.12 which addresses the method for a proper relief of the entire watch, including systems removed or returned to service. This procedure is available for inspection at the Brunswick plant.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 9

- 1) Carolina Power & Light Company will notify the NRC within one hour whenever it is determined that the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. Furthermore, Carolina Power & Light Company will establish an open, continuous, communication channel to the NRC using the recently established designated phone network.