

Georgia Power Company
230 Peachtree Street
Post Office Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Telephone 404 522-6060

R. J. Kelly
Vice President and General Manager
Power Generation



August 10, 1979

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366
OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2
I&E BULLETIN 79-08 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Gentlemen:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's July 20, 1979, letter requested additional information with regard to our response to I&E Bulletin 79-08 in order to complete the safety evaluation for Plant Hatch.

Please find attached the additional information requested by your letter.

Very truly yours,

R. J. Kelly

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Attachment

xc: Mr. Ruble A. Thomas
George F. Trowbridge, Esquire

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ATTACHMENT

RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. We have reviewed the procedures involving containment isolation initiation and have initiated design changes where needed to assure containment isolation initiation.
2. We have reviewed plant drawings and have determined that all lines or systems not required for ECCS functions do auto isolate except for the CAD system valves previously referred to in the May 9 response.
3. The Primary Containment Atmospheric Control System procedure is already in effect which calls for a specific operator action in order to open the CAD system valves to allow for normal venting or action upon automatic initiation of safety injection on Unit 1. Unit 2 uses the normal vent and purge system valves for normal venting which already auto isolates upon automatic initiation. DCRs 79-231 and 79-277 have been initiated on Units 1 and 2 respectively to provide for auto isolation of the CAD system valves. The DCRs are scheduled for completion on the first scheduled outage upon receipt of all engineering materials.

ITEM 4

Type	No.	Range	Use
Gemac Recorder	2	0.5 to 2.5 psig	Normal DW pressure
Gemac Recorder	2	133 in. to 166 in.	Normal Torus Level
Taylor Recorder	1	0-500 ⁰ F	Torus water temperature
Taylor Recorder	1	0-500 ⁰ F	Torus air temperature
Gemac Indicator	1	0-40 x 1000 mr	Inaccessible Area Reactor Building radiation
Gemac Recorder	1	10 ⁻² -10 ²	Drywell and Torus Vent radiation
Gemac Recorder	1	1-10 ⁶	Containment radiation
Gemac Recorder	1	0-125 gpm	Equipment drain sump pump flow-by observing pumping frequency drywell leak detection used to monitor drywell leakage and thus coolant inventory
Gemac Timer	10	0-150 minutes	Equipment drain sump pump timers also can be used to monitor drywell leakage and thus coolant inventory
Gemac Recorder	1	0 - 1200 psig	Wide range reactor pressure indication can be used to monitor sudden pressure or coolant losses.

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ITEM 5

Operators are instructed to not override automatic actions of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions and not to rely upon vessel level indication alone for manual action. This instruction is provided by the training department and documented attendance is required as earlier stated in response to Items 1 and 5.

ITEM 6

1. Data sheets in the Normal operating/valve line up procedures provide for documentation of valve position and valve locking mechanism if required.

ITEM 7

1. The only valves designed for the transfer of radioactive gases and liquids outside of primary containment is the Drywell Vent and Purge system valves and the Radwaste Sump Isolation valves. Since these valves are Class I valves and are located outside of containment these valves would not be affected by a LOCA environment and thus are justified for continued operability post accident.
2. The valves that could inadvertently transfer radioactive gases from containment by the resetting of an engineered safety feature has had administrative procedural controls that required the valves to be placed in the closed position prior to resetting. A plant modification will also be installed at the first scheduled outage upon receipt of engineering and parts for the modification which will install an additional reset for these radwaste isolation valves. Another plant modification will install isolations signals on the Unit 1 CAD system valves which are now used for venting. These valves are procedurally only opened for venting when an operator is present which keeps these valves closed should an accident occur.

ITEM 8

Procedure HNP-17 Relief of Personnel gives direction for the proper relief of all plant operating personnel.

The following is a minimum that is transmitted verbally to the oncoming shift:

1. Summary status of plant conditions
2. Identify any equipment which might be in the off standard condition (tagged out for maintenance, etc.)
3. Status of any surveillance tests that were performed on shift or are in progress.
4. Any significant changes in routine operations which occurred on shift.
5. Review of any special orders, night orders, etc.
6. Any forms that might be in progress (MRs, RWPs, clearances, etc.)
7. Any changes in personnel.

The oncoming shift must also review their respective logs and initial each page of the previous two shifts prior to assuming the shift. He must then review the rest of the log.

The shift foreman must review all active clearances since his last working shift.

The shift foremen's and the operator's logs are required to contain an entry when a system or component is removed from service. This is required by procedure HNP-816 Operating Logs and Entries.

When a system is removed from service there must be a maintenance request form and the system must be tagged out per equipment clearance and tagging procedure HNP-501. The shift foreman maintains a file of maintenance requests in progress. This is per Maintenance Request procedure HNP-8.

When a safety system is removed from service HNP-902 Inoperable status indication for nuclear power plant safety systems requires the following:

1. Log the time, date, and system found or made inoperable in the shift foreman's log.
2. Log the above information in the Cumulative Down Time Log per HNP-901.
3. Energize the appropriate safety system status light to indicate that the system is inoperable.

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ITEM 8 Continued

When a safety system is returned to operable status HNP-902 again requires the following:

1. Log the time and date system returned to service or made operable in the shift foreman's log.
2. Log above information in the Cumulative Down time log per HNP-901.
3. De-energize the system status light to indicate the system has been returned to service or operable status.

ITEM 9

Standing order 79-14 was issued on May 15, 1979, as an interim means of implementing the reporting and continuous communications requirements of Item No. 9.

On August 7, 1979, plant procedure HNP-512 was approved by the plant manager to delineate use of the OPX system. This procedure requires immediate NRC notification as a minimum in the event of a site or general emergency, exceeding any safety limit or any event described in 10 CFR 20.403(a). In addition, the network shall be used where it is apparent that immediate NRC attention is necessary. This may include some, but certainly not all, plant notification now required.

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