NRC FORM 366
7 7 1

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 | G A E I H 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE (8–14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) | LICENSE TYPE (26–30) | CAT (57–58)

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 6 1 2 7 9 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 6 2 7 7 9 (9)

(60) (61–68) (69–74) (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 | Reactor maximum cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour was exceeded on June 12,1979.

3 | Due to HPCI and condensate booster pump injection of water into reactor vessel follow-

4 | ing a reactor scram, reactor coolant temperature changed 130 degrees F in a one hour

5 | period. Reactor MSIV's were closed and injection of water to vessel stopped. Evalua-

6 | tion of this type of transient was conducted by Reactor Engineering and reported on

7 | occurrence number 50-366/1978-63. Report confirmed that due to evaluation of other

8 | temperature indications for overall Reactor coolant systems and by observing (con't)

(8–80)

9 | SYSTEM CODE: Z Z (11) | CAUSE CODE: A (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(9–10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (13–18) | (19) | (20)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 7 9 (21–22) | — (23) | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 2 (24–26) | / (27) | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 (28–29) | REPORT TYPE L (30) | — (31) | REVISION NO. 0 (32)

ACTION TAKEN: H (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB: Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

(33) | (34) | (35) | (36) | (37–40) | (41) | (42) | (43) | (44–47)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | During Reactor Scram, HPCI was manually started and water injected into Reactor Vessel

11 | to increase water inventory. This caused a rapid pressure and temperature drop

12 | which allowed condensate booster pumps to introduce excess water into Reactor Vessel.

13 | Personnel have been cautioned about reactor pressure decreases below a system pressure

14 | that could inject into reactor vessel and to observe pressure decrease and level (cont)

(9–80)

15 | FACILITY STATUS: B (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Plant Personnel Observation

(9) | (10–12) | (13–44) | (45) | (46–80)

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

(9) | (10) | (11–44) | (45–80)

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

(9–11) | (12) | (13–80)

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

(9–11) | (12–80)

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

(9) | (10–80)

20 | PUBLICITY: ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

(9) | (10–68) | (69–80)

281 310

7907050376

NAME OF PREPARER: S. X. Baxley, Supt. of Operations PHONE: (912) 367-7781

Event Description and Probable Consequences

Reactor Vessel metal temperatures (Delta T's) that no significant stress occurred to reactor vessel or coolant systems. There was no personnel injuries or overexposure or any release of radioactive materials to the environs as a result of this occurrence.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions

increase very closely in transient conditions to prevent exceeding reactor cooldown rates.