

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE												CAT																																																													

REPORT SOURCE: 1 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 Reactor maximum cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour was exceeded on June 12, 1979.

3 | Due to HPCI and condensate booster pump injection of water into reactor vessel follow-

Q4: During a reactor scram, reactor coolant temperature changed 130 degrees F in a one hour

period. Reactor MSIV's were closed and injection of water to vessel stopped. Evalua-

tion of this type of transient was conducted by Reactor Engineering and reported on

7 | occurrence number 50-366/1978-63. Report confirmed that due to evaluation of other

8	temperature indications for overall Reactor coolant systems and by observing (con't)
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SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

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(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR  
79—  
21 22 23

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 052/  
24 25 26 27

OCCURRENCE CODE 03  
28 29

REPORT TYPE L—  
30 31

REVISION NO. 0  
32

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS					ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
[H]	[18]	[Z]	[19]	[Z]	[20]	[Z]	[21]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[Y]	[23]	[Y]	[24]	[Z]	[25]	[Z]	[9]	[9]	[9]	
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

0	During Reactor Scram, HPCI was manually started and water injected into Reactor Vessel
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to increase water inventory. This caused a rapid pressure and temperature drop

which allowed condensate booster pumps to introduce excess water into Reactor Vessel.

Personnel have been cautioned about reactor pressure decreases below a system pressure.

that could inject into reactor vessel and to observe pressure decrease and level (cont)

FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
5	B	(28)	0	0	0	NA	A (31)	Plant Personnel Observation (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
6 7 12 13 44 45 46 80  
NA NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER					
7	0	0	0	37	Z
				38	NA

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PERSONNEL INJURIES			
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	NA	
000	(41)		

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)		
TYPE	DESCRIPTION		NA	281 310
9	2 (42)			

8 9 10 PUBLICITY (45) 7907050376 NRC USE ONLY 80

NAME OF PREPARED: S. X. Baxley, Supt. of Operations PHONE: (912) 367-7781

POOR ORIGINAL

281 310

7907050376

NRC USE ONLY

PHONE (912) 367-7781

#### Event Description and Probable Consequences

Reactor Vessel metal temperatures (Delta T's) that no significant stress occurred to reactor vessel or coolant systems. There was no personnel injuries or overexposure or any release of radioactive materials to the environs as a result of this occurrence.

#### Cause Description and Corrective Actions

increase very closely in transient conditions to prevent exceeding reactor cooldown rates.

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