

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

COUNT  
011

REPORT SOURCE  
X 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 6 2 8 7 9 3 0 7 0 3 7 9 9

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

ROCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While reviewing pipe support design for concrete anchor bolt surveillance purposes, it

0 3 | was determined that the radwaste sump discharge piping between the drywell penetra-

0 4 | tions (X-18, X-19) and the second containment isolation valves (G11-F004, F020) is not

0 5 | supported per seismic Class I requirements. This is contrary to the criteria of FSAR

0 6 | Section 1.6.7.1. The reactor was in the refueling mode when this deficiency was

0 7 | discovered. This is not a repetitive occurrence.

[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 The cause of this event is design error. The Unit 1 piping specification did not  
111 specify this pipe as seismic Class I. After evaluating the piping supports as pres-  
112 ently installed, it has been determined that this piping is not adequately supported  
113 for the postulated seismic event. The piping supports will be redesigned and in-  
114 stalled to meet seismic Class I requirements. (continued)

FACILITY STATUS (30)      % POWER      OTHER STATUS (30)      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5    H (38)    0 0 0 (39)    N/A    D (31)    Notification from A/E

ACTIVITY		CONTENT		RELEASED		OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	5	Z	33	Z	34	N/A		N/A		N/A	

PERSONNEL INJURIES				30	
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION	
11	12	13	41	N/A	

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1 1 1 7 (42)	N/A	

ISSUED 1 MAY 68 DESCRIPTION (45) 340 052 NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER T. V. Greene, Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv. PHONE 912-367-7781

79071702/8

1000

Georgia Power Company  
Plant E. I. Hatch  
Baxley, Georgia 31515

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

This design deficiency will be resolved during the current refueling outage, under the concrete expansion anchor surveillance and testing program.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY - (LER #50-321/1979-043)

While performing concrete expansion anchor surveillance evaluation for Unit 1, it was determined that the drywell radwaste sump discharge piping between the drywell penetrations and the second isolation valves is not supported per seismic Class I requirements. This is contrary to the criteria of FSAR section 1.6.7.1, and is reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i. The reactor was in the refueling mode when this deficiency was discovered.

The cause of this event is design error. The Unit 1 piping specification did not specify the subject pipe as seismic Class I. It has been determined that the existing piping is not adequately supported for the postulated seismic event.

This piping will be analyzed and supported seismically. Implementation will be accomplished during the current refueling outage under the concrete expansion anchor surveillance and testing program.

The similar Unit 2 piping is installed as seismic Class I.