BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

P.O. BOX 1475

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
SUPPLY

May 8, 1979

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Attention: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director

Subject: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318
IE Bulletin 79-06B

Reference: (1) A. E. Lundvall, Jr. letter to Boyce H. Grier dated April 26, 1979, same subject

Gentlemen:

As stated in Reference (1), we have completed our review of the information provided by our NSSS supplier regarding items 2, 6 and 11 of the subject bulletin. The applicable plant procedures have been reviewed and revised as necessary to incorporate the specific instructions provided by the bulletin and by the NSSS supplier regarding these items.

A description of the results of this review and the revisions made are provided below.

ITEM 2

During normal operations, pressurizer temperature is maintained at least 50°F above the reactor coolant system temperature by proper operation of the chemical volume control system (CVCS), pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray. These systems are normally operated in the automatic mode and have associated control board alarms to provide annunciation of off-normal conditions. Procedures governing the routine operation of pressurizer pressure control, CVCS, and degas were reviewed and found to be adequate. Additionally, the procedures governing non-routine plant evolutions, such as establishing and recovering from solid water conditions, were reviewed and deemed to provide adequate assurance of maintaining subcooled RCS conditions.

The plant emergency procedure for a loss of coolant accident has been revised and expanded to emphasize the recognition and prevention of void formation in the RCS and the enhancement of core cooling subsequent to void formation should it occur. Such actions are primarily based on the operation of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system, the Reactor Coolant Pumps and natural circulation flow; these actions are further discussed under item 6 below.

ITEM 6

As mentioned under item 2 above, the plant emergency procedures regarding the initiation of ECCS have been reviewed and the emergency procedure for a loss of coolant accident has been revised based on the specific instructions required by the subject bulletin and information provided by our NSSS supplier. The review and alterations to the procedures have provided for the following specific considerations:

1. Procedures which require the override of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) signals have been reviewed; such overrides are deemed to be appropriate and not to cause any adverse effects on needed safety features to support core cooling. For example, once containment pressure decays below the CSAS/CIS setpoint, it is desirable to reset and reestablish cooling flow to the RCP's, as well as inhibit Containment Spray to prevent unnecessary damage to the RCP's (Containment coolers are fully redundant to the spray system).

2. The emergency procedure for a loss of reactor coolant has been revised to include the specific instructions required by the subject bulletin and endorsed by our NSSS supplier regarding the conditions required before the HPSI system can be inhibited following automatic initiation of ECCS.

3. The emergency procedure for a loss of reactor coolant has been revised to require the continued operation of one RCP in each loop (if power is available) as long as forced flow is being provided by the pumps, as indicated by pump amps, whenever the core outlet temperature is less than 20°F subcooled. All RCP's may be stopped if the core outlet temperature is more than 20°F subcooled.

4. Appropriate cautions have been added to the loss of reactor coolant procedure regarding reliance on the pressurizer level instruments. Specifically, these instruments should not be the sole source of information by which the HPSI system is stopped; the criteria discussed in 2 above must be met before the HPSI system is inhibited.

ITEM 11

A detailed description of the detection and control of hydrogen gas in the containment is included in Reference (1). Likewise, as stated in Reference (1), the present "degas" procedure using the Volume Control Tank is effective during routine operations and could also be utilized in a post-accident situation. Alternative post-accident methods for the removal of hydrogen from the RCS are: (1) the stripping of gas in the RCS waste system degassifier, and (2) the removal of gas from the pressurizer "steam space" via the sample line and Volume Control Tank. Both of these methods allow the gas to be compressed and stored in the Waste Gas Storage Tanks which have a capacity in excess of 20,000 SCF.

Should you have further questions regarding these matters, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

J. A. Lundvall, Jr.

for A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President - Supply

AEL/RED/dds

Copies To: J. A. Biddison, Esquire
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
E. L. Conner, Jr., NRC
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC
R. Sanacore, American Nuclear Insurers

313 045