NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE 14	15	LICENSE NUMBER 25	26	LICENSE TYPE 30	57 CAT 58
0	1	A	L	J	M	F	1	0 0 – 0 0 0 0 – 0 0				4	1 1 1 1	

CON'T

1	2	7	8	REPORT SOURCE 60	61	DOCKET NUMBER 68	69	EVENT DATE 74	75	REPORT DATE 80
0	1	L		0 5 0 0 0 3 4 8			0 4 0 8 7 8		0 8 0 8 7 9	

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

02 At 2238 on 4/8/78, while changing turbine governor valve control from single
03 to sequential valve control, a DEH malfunction caused a load rejection of
04 approximately 170 MW. This caused a momentary Tavg rise to 582F (per
05 Tave/Tref recorder). T/S 3.2.5 requires Tavg to be maintained less than or
06 equal to 581.2F. The rod control system automatically responded and
07 reduced Tavg to less than 581.2F. This was a momentary transient. The
08 health/safety of the public was not affected.

09	SYSTEM CODE 9–10	CAUSE CODE 11	CAUSE SUBCODE 12	COMPONENT CODE 13–18	COMP. SUBCODE 19	VALVE SUBCODE 20
	A A	E	G	X X X X X X	Z	Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR 21–22	23	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24–26	27	OCCURRENCE CODE 28–29	REPORT TYPE 30	31	REVISION NO. 32
	7 8	–	0 2 4	/	0 3	L	–	1

ACTION TAKEN 33	FUTURE ACTION 34	EFFECT ON PLANT 35	SHUTDOWN METHOD 36	HOURS 37–40	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 42	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44–47
X	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	N	W 1 2 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

10 Load rejection due to DEH malfunction resulted in momentary increase in
11 Tavg. The control rods were automatically stepped in and Tavg was reduced.
12 A Westinghouse field engineer has been onsite and identified several
13 problems contributing to the load rejection. These problems have been
14 resolved.

15	FACILITY STATUS 9	% POWER 10–12	OTHER STATUS 13–44	METHOD OF DISCOVERY 45	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 46–80
	E	0 9 2	NA	A	NA

16	ACTIVITY RELEASED 9	CONTENT OF RELEASE 10	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 11–44	LOCATION OF RELEASE 45–80
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17	NUMBER 9–11	TYPE 12	DESCRIPTION 13–80
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18	NUMBER 9–11	DESCRIPTION 12–80
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

19	TYPE 9	DESCRIPTION 10–80
		NA

PUBLICITY

20	ISSUED 9	DESCRIPTION 10–68	NRC USE ONLY 69–80
	N	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER W. G. Hairston, III PHONE: (205)899-5156

628 132 7908140745 S

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-348
ATTACHMENT TO LER 78-024/03L-1

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Unit 1

Report Date: 8/8/79

Event Date: 4/8/78

Identification of Event:

Load rejection due to DEH malfunction resulted in momentary increase in Tavg.

Conditions Prior to Event:

The plant was in mode 1 operating at 92% power. The turbine governor valve control was in single valve control.

Description of Event:

At 2238 on 4/8/78, while changing turbine governor valve control from single valve to sequential valve control, a DEH malfunction caused a load rejection of approximately 170 MW. This caused a momentary Tavg. rise to 582^{0}F (per Tavg/Tref. recorder). T/S 3.2.5 requires Tavg. to be maintained less than or equal to 581.2^{0}F. The rod control system automatically responded and reduced Tavg. to less than 581.2^{0}F. This was a momentary transient.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

A Westinghouse field engineer identified the following problems which contributed to the load rejection when changing turbine governor valve control from single valve to sequential valve control:

1. The governor valves were remaining 5% open due to the setting on GV close deadband.

2. Impulse and megawatt loops rejecting and severe load oscillations were attributed to a faulty AM card.

3. No. 3 governor valve was operating erratically due to a faulty servo-card. No. 4 governor valve had been isolated and may have contributed to the erratic operation of No. 3 governor valve.

Analysis of Event:

Tavg. was within Technical Specification limits at the time of the occurrence. Load rejection due to DEH malfunction resulted in a momentary increase in Tavg. The control rods automatically stepped in and Tavg. was reduced. The health and safety of the public was not affected.

Effect on Plant:

This occurrence had no significant effect on plant operation.

Corrective Action:

1. The GV close deadband was changed from 5 to 0.

2. The associated AM card was located and replaced.

3. No. 3 governor valve servo card was replaced and No. 4 governor valve has been repaired.

Failure Data:

No previous failures of the DEH, while changing turbine governor valve control from single valve to sequential valve control, have resulted in Tavg problems.